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I. INTRODUCTION
On an otherwise uneventful Christmas Eve, my niece sought an ex-
planation regarding why our family celebrates Christmas. My niece
attends a public middle school, and as I was soon to learn, her curiosity
and confusion stemmed from material that she had been taught in
school. She informed me that her teacher had affirmatively stated that
the theory of evolution is the only true explanation of "where we come
from." As my father and I attempted to explain the teachings of the
Bible, we were met with vehement protests. After all, didn't we know
that "we all come from monkeys?"'
1. In 1981, this exact fact pattern presented itself before California Superior Court
Judge Irving H. Perluss. Peter Gwynne et al., "Scopes II" in California, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 16, 1981, at 67. Kelly Segraves, co-founder of the Creation Science Research
Center, "argued that the State of California had violated the religious freedom of his
children by teaching evolution as fact." Id. Segraves' son testified that his public
school teacher insisted that he descended from an ape. Id. Judge Perluss ruled that
school teachers must qualify their discussions of evolution with a statement that
evolution is only a scientific hypothesis and not a proven fact. Id.; see Segraves v.
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The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ."2 The Supreme Court has
consistently interpreted the First Amendment as requiring government
to remain completely neutral toward religion.3 The Court has made it
perfectly clear that the First Amendment is violated when government
seeks to utilize the public school forum as a means to support or en-
courage a particular religious belief.4 It has been stories such as mine,
California Bd. of Educ., No. 278978 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 12, 1981).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the
Supreme Court applied the First Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (upholding a stat-
ute authorizing the government to reimburse parents for transportation costs incurred
in sending their children to Catholic schools); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) (ruling that compelling public school students to
recite the Pledge of Allegiance is a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments); Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 414-16 (1986) (providing a history of the incorporation of the reli-
gion clauses). For an argument challenging the incorporation of the Establishment
Clause, see Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Feder-
alist View, 105 HARv. L REV. 1700, 1700 (1992) (asserting that the Framers of the
First Amendment intended the Establishment Clause to curb federal intrusions into
church-state activity).
3. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (ruling that "moment of silence"
law endorsed religion in violation of the First Amendment); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (declaring Bible reading in public
schools unconstitutional).
But see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). The University of Missouri at
Kansas City recognized over 100 student organizations. Id. at 265. However, the Uni-
versity refused to allow a Christian student group to conduct its meetings in Univer-
sity facilities on the ground that it would violate the Establishment Clause. Id. The
Supreme Court refused to decide the case on free exercise grounds, but ruled in
favor of the Christian group on free speech grounds. Id. at 277.
As one commentator correctly noted, "[O]ne can hardly describe as 'neutral' a
state policy that provides meeting rooms to Republicans, communists, musicians, and
stamp collectors, but denies similar facilities to religious groups." Phillip E. Johnson,
Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV.
817, 820 (1984). "Such discrimination seems to imply that religion is a peculiarly
disfavored activity." Id. (emphasis added).
4. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60-61 (declaring that a "moment of silence" law violat-
ed the First Amendment because the fundamental purpose of the law was to promote
religion); see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (striking down a statute
requiring the Ten Commandments to be posted in public school classrooms);
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205 (declaring Bible reading in public schools unconstitutional);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (declaring unconstitutional the recitation of a
state-composed prayer in the public schools).
however, that have prompted many commentators and religious believ-
ers to wonder whether such a one-sided teaching of evolution is also a
violation of the alleged neutrality requirement mandated by the First
Amendment.'
For more than thirty years, the Supreme Court has been plagued with
charges of First Amendment violations involving public school curricu-
lums. In fact, various organizations, bombarding local school boards
with charges that religious beliefs are unconstitutionally infiltrating the
public school curriculum, have seriously affected everyday public life.7
The purpose of this Comment is not to take the position that the
theory of evolution should be prohibited in public school classrooms.
The opposite is the case. As the primary source of education for mil-
lions of American school children, public education should be used as a
forum to propagate ideas and the vast wealth of knowledge that has
accumulated throughout the world. This Comment will, however, em-
phasize that the teaching of evolution, as fact and as the sole basis of
human origin, does raise some very serious First Amendment concerns.
The thrust of this Comment is to emphasize that there is a very fine
line between secularism and sectarianism. Just as the First Amendment
prohibits public schools from supporting theistic religions,8 so too
should the First Amendment also prohibit public school teachers from
(1) supporting non-theistic religions and (2) denigrating the theistic
beliefs held by students and their parents.' This Comment addresses
5. See, e.g., JAMES HrrCHCOCK, WHAT IS SECULAR HUMANISM? 106 (1982).
6. See supra note 4.
7. See, e.g., Carol Masciola, Judgment Day Approaches for Vista Schools, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1992, at B1. San Diego, California residents were allegedly "scared to
death" because "Christian fundamentalists" were elected to the local school board. Id.
This fear, and the labeling of the board members as "Christian fundamentalists," was
generated solely on the basis that the new members professed a belief in God and
the teachings of the Bible. Id. Many parents and teachers feared that such beliefs
would prompt the new school board to advocate such things as censorship, school
prayer, and the teaching of creation science. Id.; see also Mala Davis, Booklet OKd
Despite Uproar, L.A. TIMES,, Feb. 27, 1993, at All. The California chapters of the
League of Women Voters and the ACLU threatened to sue the Conejo Valley Unified
School Board for approving the use of a certain booklet in sex education classes. Id.
These organizations charged that the booklet, which is published by a Christian or-
ganization, violates the First Amendment because it advocates abstinence-a Christian
philosophy-as a method of avoiding teenage pregnancy and the transmission of dis-
ease. Id.
8. See supra note 4.
9. The following quotation, issued by United States District Court Judge William
B. Hand, exemplifies the purpose of this Comment. Where appropriate, the word
"Comment" has been substituted for the word "case."
The purpose of this [Comment] is not about returning prayer to the
schools .... Neither does this [Comment] represent an attempt of narrow-
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the very delicate and controversial issue of whether the teaching of
evolution in public schools violates the neutrality requirement mandated
by the First Amendment." Particularly, this Comment examines wheth-
er the teaching of evolution as fact, rather than as theory, is tantamount
to the unconstitutional establishment of the religion of Secular Human-
ism.
Section II describes the various forms of humanism and identifies
Secular Humanism as an established and identifiable belief structure."
Section III attempts to establish a working definition of religion for
First Amendment purposes." Section IV expands upon the beliefs and
tenets of Secular Humanism, compares those beliefs with a line of Su-
preme Court decisions, and concludes that Secular Humanism can be
classified as a religion for First Amendment purposes.' Section IV also
points out that various courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have explicitly stated that Secular Humanism is a religion for
First Amendment purposes. 4 Section V identifies the theory of evolu-
tion as a fundamental tenet of Secular Humanism." Section VI pro-
vides an historical analysis of the underlying meaning of the Establish-
ment Clause and the Separation of Church and State Doctrine.'" Sec-
tion VII examines the various approaches utilized by the Supreme Court
in determining whether government action violates the Establishment
minded or fanatical proreligionists to force a public school system to teach
only those opinions and facts they find digestible. Finally, this (Comment] is
not an attempt by anyone to censor materials deemed undesirable, improper,
or immoral. What this [Comment] is about is the allegedly improper promo-
tion of certain religious beliefs, thus violating the constitutional prohibitions
against the establishment of religion ....
Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 974 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684
(11th Cir. 1987). For a detailed discussion of Smith and its ramifications on this Com-
ment, see infra notes 257-75 and accompanying text.
10. As one commentator noted, "A textbook that teaches that the human species
evolved gradually over millions of years from simple life forms is anything but neu-
tral from the viewpoint of Biblical iterists." Johnson, supra note 3, at 823. Although
our "politically correct" society often tends to persecute rather than commend the
"Biblical literist," this Comment assumes that the drafters of the First Amendment
intended to protect the religious freedoms and liberties of everyone-including the
"Biblical literist."
11. See infra notes 20-64 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 65-171 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 172-299 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 254-81 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 300-71 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 372-416 and accompanying text.
Clause. 7 In light of these approaches, Section VII concludes that the
teaching of evolution in the public schools, especially if taught as fact
rather than theory, is tantamount to furthering the tenets of a religion,
and is therefore arguably a violation of the Establishment Clause. 8
Section VIII provides a possible solution to this seemingly unresolvable
dilemma.19
II. SECULAR HUMANISM-MYTH OR REALITY?
The term "Secular Humanism" is often surrounded by confusion and
controversy." Much of this confusion stems from the usage of the
term by the modem media." The custom in the press is to imply that
Secular Humanism is something "which does not really exist."' The
media often portrays Secular Humanism as a fiction created by extreme
fundamentalists as a tool to discredit others who do not share their
views.'
The term "humanism" also creates confusion because the word has
various distinctive meanings.u Although the term generally refers to a
belief structure that places great emphasis on man and his intrinsic im-
portance,u author James Hitchcock2 1 identifies four distinct types of
17. See infra notes 417-528 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 444-528 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 529-73 and accompanying text.
20. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 7.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.; see also Kenneth E. Woodward & Eloise Salholz, The Right's New Bogey-
man, NEWSWEEK, July, 6, 1981, at 48. The media also portrays Secular Humanism as
an anti-Christian creed created by fundamentalists as a means to attack the govern-
ment, the media, and public education curriculums. Id.
While such portrayals are erroneous, as will be demonstrated in Section II and
Section IV(A), it is not surprising that such characterizations exist. Jerry Falwell,
president of the Moral Majority, a fundamentalist religious organization, has often
attacked Secular Humanism as a belief structure that "advocates abortion on demand,
recognition of homosexual[ity], free use of pornography, legalizing of prostitution and
gambling, and free use of drugs, among other things." ROBERT E. WEBBER, SECULAR
HUMANISM: THREAT AND CHALLENGE 19 (1982) (citing Charles Krauthammer, The Hu-
manist Phantom, NEW REPUBLIC, July 25, 1981, at 21).
Members of the judiciary have also greatly misunderstood the term Secular Hu-
manism. For example, Justice Nolan of the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that
Secular Humanism is tantamount to "modern paganism." Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 640 (Mass. 1986) (Nolan, J., dissenting).
24. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 7-8. For a discussion of the different types of
humanism, see infra notes 2947 and accompanying text.
25. WEBBER, supra note 23, at 20.
26. Hitchcock's credentials include an M.A. and a Ph.D. from Princeton University.
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humanism. 7 Despite the fallacies propagated by the media and other
commentators, Hitchcock's analysis establishes that Secular Humanism
is an identifiable belief structure which does truly exist.'
Hitchcock defines the first form of humanism as simply an interest
"in those intellectual and academic disciplines called the humanities."'
The study of the humanities generally refers to the academic pursuit of
literature, history, fine art, philosophy, and theology.8 This form of
humanism focuses on what man is able to accomplish and create using
his own mind.3 In this sense, contrary to media labeling,32 there is
nothing derogatory about calling a person a humanist-even from a
"fundamentalist" perspective.'
The second form of humanism, in comparison to the first form, can
almost be classified as "anti-humanism."' Hitchcock notes that, con-
trary to the first form which focuses on the inherent dignity of human
beings, the second form regards mankind as being insignificant and
"almost a plaything of the gods." ' This form of humanism is often la-
beled as a "perverted form of Christianity."'
Hitchcock identifies the third classification of humanism as that form
which is exemplified by the so-called "back to nature" movement. 7
Modem day environmentalism characterizes this form of humanism as
the desire to protect nature from the pollution and destruction caused
by mankind.' In its extreme form, however, environmentalism also
becomes "anti-humanistic" because it places elements of the ecosystem
Hitchcock is presently a professor of history at St. Louis University and editor of the
quarterly journal Communio. For a detailed analysis of Hitchcock's perspectives on
Secular Humanism, see generally HITCHCOCK, supra note 5. See also Smith v. Board
of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 963 (S.D. Ala) (Hitchcock providing expert testi-
mony as to the meaning of Secular Humanism), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
27. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 8-10.
28. Id. at 11-17.
29. Id. at 8.
30. Id.; see also WEBBER, supra note 23, at 21.
31. WEBBER, supra note 23, at 20.
32. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
33. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 8; WEBBER, supra note 23, at 21.
34. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 8.
35. Id.
36. Id. Hitchcock reasons that this form of humanism appears in some cultures,
but it is not based on the Bible.
37. Id. at 9.
38. Id.
on an equal or greater level than human beings.' For example, Hitch-
cock points out that many environmentalists argue that animals have
rights equal to human beings and advocate birth restrictions as a means
to protect nature.4
Hitchcock identifies the fourth form of humanism as that form which
characterizes the modem notion of "Secular Humanism."4' Just as the
third form of humanism distinguishes man from nature, Secular Human-
ism separates man from God.42 In this sense, humanism is a way of life
which "excludes God and all religion in the traditional sense."' Propo-
nents advocate that man "marks the highest point to which nature has
yet evolved, and [therefore, man] must rely entirely on his own resourc-
es."' "[Clonfidence in man, opposition to supernaturalism, faith in sci-
ence, and humanitarianism" characterize this form of humanism. 45 It is
this form that is most often labeled as "Secular Humanism" or "reli-
gious humanism. "4' Therefore, it is this form of humanism that this
Comment will develop and focus upon.
Although the roots of Secular Humanism can be traced back more
than 2000 years to the Greco-Roman world and the Judeo-Christian
heritage," it was not until the 1930s that organizations such as the
American Humanist Association emerged in the United States to pro-
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 10.
42. Id. It is for this reason that Secular Humanism is also referred to as
"nontheistic humanism" or "atheistic humanism." WEBBER, supra note 23, at 37. It
should be noted, however, that Secular Humanism is not strictly atheism because
many Secular Humanists believe that God may exist, but only in the abstract.
HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 11-12.
43. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 10.
44. Id.
45. WEBBER, supra note 23, at 28 (citing PAUL KURTz, Humanism and the Moral
Revolution, in THE HuMANIST ALTERNATIVE 49 (1973)). For a more detailed discussion
of Secular Humanist beliefs from the perspective of a self-proclaimed Secular Human-
ist, see generally PAUL KuRTz, IN DEFENSE OF SECULAR HuMANISM (1983).
46. See HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 10.
47. Id. at 11.
48. WEBBER, supra note 23, at 21. "In the Greco-Roman world, Protagoras, a Greek
philosopher of the fifth century B.C., first articulated humanism when he proclaimed
that 'man is the measure of all things.'" Id.
The emphasis on man and his importance can also be traced to the Judeo-Chris-
tian heritage. Id. "'At the heart [of the Christian faith] stands the confession that
God-the originator of everything right and good-himself became man.'" Id. at 23
(quoting Mark Noll, Christianity and Humanistic Values in Eighteenth Century
America: A Bicentennial Review, 6 CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR'S REV. 114-15 (1976)). The
Christian focus on the importance of humanity has been labeled "Christian Human-
ism" or "Biblical Humanism." Id.
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mulgate the beliefs of Secular Humanism." However, traditional reli-
gion and conservative moral values characterized a great part of this
nation's history up until the 1960s.' As a result, Secular Humanist or-
ganizations did not attract much attention at the time.5 It was not un-
til approximately 1965 that the focus of American social and political
life gradually shifted away from fundamentalist conservatism toward
secularization.'
Some commentators have theorized that the Secular Humanist move-
ment gained momentum as a result of the many social changes that
occurred during the 1960s.' "[R]eligion and traditional morality were
closely identified with what [became known as] 'the establishment.'" '
The anti-establishment movement, which characterized the social cli-
mate of the 1960s, attacked traditional religion as being a life-style that
was not appropriate or suitable to the changed society.'
Hitchcock also suggests that material prosperity, which marked the
period between 1945 and 1975, prompted the shift toward secularism.'
During this period, "most Americans experienced a constantly and per-
ceptibly rising standard of living.""7 This prosperity began to impress
upon people a belief in their own powers, a belief which "was ultimate-
ly inimical to religion."' As the world became viewed more as man's
own creation, rather than the creation of God, there was little room left
49. HITChCOCK, supra note 5, at 11.
50. WEBBER, supra note 23, at 49-56. From the days of the early sixteenth century
settlers until the 1960s, religion was generally regarded as a "good thing." James
Hitchcock, Church, State, and Moral Values: The Limits of American Pluralism, 44
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1981). There was "a general assumption that civic and
private virtue depended upon religious belief." Id. In fact, America was generally
perceived as "a nation of church-going and God-fearing people." Id. For instance, on
the date of his assassination, President Kennedy was scheduled to deliver a speech at
the Dallas Trade Mart which included "a message extolling the virtues of biblical
righteousness for a nation desiring to remain strong." F. LAGARD SMITH, WHEN CHOICE
BECOMES GOD 53 (1990).
51. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 13.
52. Id. at 56-57. "Secularization" is defined as "a movement away from 'an histori-
cal order of life that presupposes religious sanctions.'" WEBBER, supra note 23, at 11
(citing BERNARD E. MELAND, THE SECULARIZATION OF MODERN CULTUREs 3 (1966)).
53. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 57.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 58.
for the traditional God in the lives of many people.' "People who
thought they could obtain anything they wanted through their own ef-
forts... experienced little dependence on God."' These people, in
their own self-worship, became true Secular Humanists.'
Despite the origins of the Secular Humanist movement, there can be
no doubt that America has undergone a rapid secularization process; a
process that some believe is not complete.Y As a result, contrary to
many popular misconceptions,' Secular Humanism is an identifiable
system of beliefs and values of which there are many proponents."
III. DEFINING "RELIGION" FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PURPOSES
Before addressing the critical issue of whether Secular Humanism is
a religion, it is essential to define the term "religion" in the context of
the First Amendment. The First Amendment unequivocably confers a
special constitutional status upon religion.' However, there has been
much conflict in attempting to establish a set definition of religion for
First Amendment purposes.' Although the constitutional meaning of
59. Id. at 59. Hence the Old Testament adage that "when men prosper they tend
to forget God." Id. at 57.
60. Id. at 59.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 60. Paul Kurtz, a leading proponent of Secular Humanism, editor of The
Humanist magazine, and drafter of The Humanist Manifesto II, argues that many of
the world's major religions are losing ground. PAUL. KuRrz, IN DEFENSE OF SECULAR
HUMANISM 6, 194 (1983). Although Kurtz does not believe that Secular Humanism will
completely replace theism in American culture, he is encouraged by the developments
that Secular Humanism has made in the modem world. Id. at 190-98.
63. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
64. Kurtz argues that in 1983, there were only ten thousand members of humanist
organizations throughout the United States. KURTz, supra note 62, at 6. Kurtz admits,
however, that the number of actual hiumanists in the United States may range in the
millions. Id. In fact, at least one commentator has argued that society's shift toward
Secular Humanism has become so broad and pervasive that members of Christianity
and other orthodox religions have been forced to "gradually retreat from the political,
economic, legal, and scientific realms of life." WEBBER, supra note 23, at 16.
For a detailed analysis of the meaning of both "humanism" and "Secular Human-
ism," see Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 960-71 (S.D. Ala.)
(examining expert testimony as to the meaning of humanism and Secular Humanism),
rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
65. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also M. Elisabeth Bergeron, Note,
"New Age" or New Testament?: Toward a More Faithful Interpretation of "Religion,"
65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 365 passim (1991) (advocating a flexible, unitary approach to
defining religion to protect minority religious groups).
66. Note, Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1606, 1622 (1987).
[Vol. 21: 477, 1994] Government's Denigration of Religion
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
religion has been discussed at great length,67 the Supreme Court has
never provided an absolute definition under the First Amendment.' In
addition to judicial avoidance, commentators also strongly disagree on
how to define religion for First Amendment purposes.'
67. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72
CAL. L. REV. 753 (1984) (noting that religion should include all beliefs which are
analogous to traditional religious beliefs); Johnson, supra note 3 (positing that no
satisfactory definition of religion is likely to be developed); George C. Freeman III,
The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of 'Religion', 71 GEO. L.J.
1519 (1983) (arguing that a definition of religion cannot be established); Jesse H.
Chopper, Defining 'Religion' in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579 (1982)
(proposing a narrow functional definition of religion); Paul J. Toscano, A Dubious
Neutrality: The Establishment of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 177 (1979) (asserting that religion should be broadly defined to include any be-
lief system that an individual can call religious); Gail Merel, The Protection of Indi-
vidual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment,
45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805 (1978) (arguing that any belief system that an individual sin-
cerely asserts as religious in nature should be considered religious); Developments in
the Lau-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1622 n.54 (citing LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6 (1978) (suggesting that beliefs which are
arguably religious should be considered religious for Free Exercise purposes and
beliefs which are arguably non-religious should not be considered religious for Estab-
lishment purposes)); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1056 (1978) (exploring the Supreme Court's definition of religion under both
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause).
68. Bergeron, supra note 65, at 366 (citations omitted). Bergeron notes that "[m]ost
judicial opinions even approaching the question have scrupulously avoided the 'deli-
cate task.'" Id. (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).
69. Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1622. At
one end of the spectrum, some commentators argue that there can be no satisfactory
definition of religion for constitutional purposes. Id. at 1622 n.54 (citing Johnson, su-
pra note 3, at 832). At the other end, other commentators argue that the definition
of religion should be broad enough to include any meaningful belief structure. Id.
(citing Toscano, supra note 67, at 207).
Still other commentators have conveniently sought to define religion in such a
way as to accommodate their own purposes and beliefs. Such attempts, however,
often operate to the detriment of others who share varied ideologies. For example,
Laurence Tribe, a distinguished legal scholar, suggests that beliefs which are arguably
religious should be considered religious for Free Exercise purposes, but beliefs that
are arguably non-religious should not be considered religious for Establishment pur-
poses. TRIBE, supra note 67, at 823-33.
This dual definition approach has the effect of permitting those groups who
possess beliefs that are arguably both religious and non-religious "to claim the bene-
fits of the Free Exercise Clause without incurring the burdens of the Establishment
Clause." Johnson, supra note 3, at 835.
Members of traditional, "indisputably religious" churches could hardly be ex-
A. The Ramifications of Defining Religion
Much of the conflict and reluctance associated with establishing a
working definition of religion stems from the important ramifications
such a definition would have on First Amendment jurisprudence.7' De-
fining religion would unavoidably determine "what the First Amend-
ment will prohibit and what it will protect."7 On one hand, a set defi-
nition "by defining what a religion must be, may violate [the First
Amendment] by establishing a distinctive notion of religion that ex-
cludes some legitimate forms of religion. "' On the other hand, "a truly
comprehensive definition may be so broad as to be unhelpful."'
Nonetheless, some commentators stress that formulating a set defini-
tion of religion is critical due to the constant and rapid expansion of
religious beliefs and perspectives in this country.74 In support of this
position, it is worth noting that in 1987 more than 1300 recognized reli-
gions existed in the United States.' "As the commonality of our beliefs
has declined, the sacred and the secular have increasingly merged."'
At least one author argues that because of this expansion, the Supreme
pected to see the dual definition as anything but legalistic flim-flam in the
service of non-theistic religious ideology. Indeed, if the Supreme Court were
to endorse Tribe's reasoning, it would lend support to the claim of some reli-
gious fundamentalists that the public schools and other governmental agencies
are currently establishing a form of secular religion.
Id.
This Comment does not attempt to create or suggest a working definition of reli-
gion. The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the structure and beliefs of Secular
Humanism in light of previous Supreme Court rulings and to objectively argue that the
tenets of Secular Humanism are analogous to a traditional religion, and should there-
fore be treated as such for First Amendment purposes.
70. Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1623.
71. Id. at 1622.
72. Id. at 1623.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Bergeron, supra note 65, at 366-67. Bergeron notes that the upsurge
in religious fervor is not only reflected "in the burgeoning fundamentalist right, but
also in an explosion of 'New Age' beliefs and practices." Id. at 366 (footnotes omit-
ted). As an extreme example of the growth of divergent perspectives of religion,
Bergeron notes, "'Now is a great time for new religions to pop up. There are people
who get religious about jogging, they get religious about sex .... health foods,...
ESP, of course, flying saucers, anything is fertile ground now. There's a messiah born
every day.'" Id. at 365 (quoting TOM WOLFE, TWENTY YEARS OF ROLLING STONE: WHAT
A LONG STRANGE TRIP ITS BEEN 340 (J.S. Wenner ed., 1987)); see also Toward a Con-
stitutional Definitiois of Religion, supra note 67, at 1069-72 (commenting on the
wide disparity among religious beliefs in the United States).
75. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGION (2d ed. 1987) (listing 1347
religions in the United States).
76. Bergeron, supra note 65, at 367.
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Court must set forth a workable definition of religion that would enable
the lower courts to distinguish "between the religious, and non-reli-
gious, without imposing ethnocentric and majoritarian values." '
B. Approaching Religion from a Sociological Perspective
In formulating a definition of religion for First Amendment purposes,
some commentators have looked to developments in the social sciences
for assistance.' Social scientists have made the distinction between a
substantive and a functional definition of religion.' A substantive, or
content-based, definition identifies an individual's beliefs as religious or
non-religious based on the substance of his beliefs.' A substantive def-
inition of religion would primarily include traditional theistic beliefs
such as Christianity and Judaism."
On the other hand, a functional definition is not based upon the con-
tent of one's beliefs, but declares a person's beliefs as "religious or non-
religious based on either how a person behaves or how the putatively
religious beliefs function in a person's life. "' A functional definition
provides a much broader definition, and therefore, would recognize
both theistic and non-theistic beliefs as religion.' Examples of reli-
gions based upon a functional definition include Confucianism, Bud-
dhism, and arguably certain forms of humanism.'
Despite the Supreme Court's reluctance to articulate a clear definition
of religion, the Court's past decisions provide a very helpful guide in
determining what the Court will and will not consider to be religion for
77. Id.
78. Developments in the Law--Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1623-24.
79. Id. at 1623.
80. Id.
81. Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 967 (S.D. Ala.) (analyzing
expert testimony as to the meaning of religion), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
82. Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1624. For
a detailed analysis of the numerous sociological and philosophical definitions of reli-
gion, see Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 965-68 (analyzing expert testimony as to the mean-
ing of religion). Some commentators assert that religion refers to the worship of, and
belief in, a deity. Id. at 966. Other commentators argue that religion is a very broad
concept that should encompass "one's ultimate concerns in life." Id.
83. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 967-68.
84. Id.; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961). For a more detailed
analysis of the functional approach, see generally Ben Clements, Comment, Defining
'Religion' in the First Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532
(1989).
First Amendment purposes. As Sections III(C)(1) through III(C)(3) de-
tail,' the Supreme Court has moved from a more substantive definition
to a more functional definition of religion over the past century.6
C. The Supreme Court's Ever-Changing Definition of Religion:
Substantive vs. Functional
1. The Initial Substantive Approach
Prior, to the twentieth century, the term religion was assumed to
mean theism.87 In 1878, the Supreme Court first attempted to define
religion in Reynolds v. United States.' Pursuant to existing federal
law, the acts of bigamy and polygamy were criminal offenses.' The
defendant, Reynolds, was a member of the Mormon faith which prac-
ticed polygamy.' Reynolds argued that his practice of polygamy was
consistent with the tenets of his religion and, therefore, the federal law
banning polygamy violated his freedom of religion under the First
Amendment."
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal law,
and in doing so, provided "some general theistic guidelines by which
the religion clauses would be interpreted. " ' The basis of the Court's
decision was an assumption "that the United States was a Christian
nation that supported traditional theistic tenets." '
In 1890, the Supreme Court elaborated upon the definition of religion
in Davis v. Beason.' Pursuant to existing voter registration laws, Ida-
ho citizens were required to attest that they were not members of any
organization that encouraged bigamy or polygamy.' The defendant,
85. See infra notes 87-171 and accompanying text.
86. See Developments in the Law-Religion and the State,' supra note 66, at 1625.
87. John W. Whitehead & John Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secu-
lar Humanism and its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 2
(1978) (postulating that the American religious base has shifted from traditional the-
ism to Secular Humanism).
88. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
89. Id. at 146.
90. Id. at 161.
91. Id. at 165-67. For a brief history of the events leading up to Reynold's convic-
tion, see Laycock, supra note 2, at 416-17.
92. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 5 (providing an analysis of Reynolds).
93. Id. at 6. In Zorach v. Clauson, Justice Douglas reiterated this sentiment by
stating, "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."
343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring).
94. 133 U.S. 333 (1890); see Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra
note 67, at 1060 (providing background and a further analysis of Davis).
95. Davis, 133 U.S. at 333. Section 501 of the Idaho Revised Statutes provided that:
[N]o person who is a bigamist or a polygamist, or who teaches, advises,
[Vol. 21: 477, 1994] Government's Denigration of Religion
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Davis, swore to such an oath when actually he was a member of the
Mormon Church, which advocated bigamy and polygamy." Davis was
tried and convicted for obstruction of justice. 7 On appeal, Davis ar-
gued that the Idaho law violated his freedom of religion under the First
Amendment.'
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the convic-
tion.' The Court adopted a true substantive definition of religion by
requiring that "religion refer to the belief in and worship of a deity.""
The Court ruled that "[t]he term 'religion' has reference to one's views
of his relations to his Creator, and the obligations they impose of rever-
ence for his being and character, and obedience to his will."'' The
Court's decision clearly reaffirmed the Reynolds substantive approach
by concluding that the scope of religion was limited to traditional the-
ism. 102
The Davis Court differentiated between valid religious beliefs and
what it termed the tenets of a "sect.""3 As to valid religious beliefs,
the Court emphasized that the First Amendment was adopted to grant
the absolute freedom to entertain and express beliefs respecting man's
relations to and with God.'" The Court continued, however, by stating
that the First Amendment was not adopted "to prohibit legislation for
the support of any religious tenets, or the modes of worship of any
counsels, or encourages any person or persons to become bigamists or polyg-
amists, . . . or who is a member of any order, organization, or association
which teaches, advises, counsels, or encourages its members or devotees ...
to commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy . . . is permitted to vote at any
election . . .within this Territory.
IDAHO CODE § 501.
96. Davis, 133 U.S. at 334-35 & n.l.
97. Id. at 334.
98. Id. at 336-37.
99. Id. at 34148.
100. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note. 87, at 7. Later, in the same term as Davis,
the Court stated that polygamy was a "barbarous practice" and "is contrary to the
spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the
Western world." Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890).
103. Davis, 133 U.S. at 342.
104. Id. (emphasis added). "With man's relations to his Maker, and the obligations
he may think they impose, and the manner in which an expression shall be made by
him of his belief on those subjects, no interference can be permitted . . . ." Id.
sect."' 6 The Court noted that, despite the First Amendment
protections, prosecution would follow criminal conduct performed
under the guise of alleged religious beliefs."' 6
2. A Move Toward the Center
In 1931, the Supreme Court gradually moved away from its substan-
tive/theistic approach in United States v. Macintosh."°7 Macintosh was
denied naturalization because he refused to swear that he would bear
arms to defend the United States."° Macintosh argued that his refusal
was based upon religious grounds."° The Court affirmed its existing
theistic approach by stating that "[tihe essence of religion is belief in a
relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any hu-
man relation.. 0 The Court, however, hinted that it was prepared to
back away from its strict theistic approach by noting that "[w]hat con-
stitutes free exercise of religion cannot perhaps be dogmatically deter-
mined."'
105. Id. at 342. In defining religion, the Court clearly looked to the traditional
teachings of Christianity to determine which beliefs would be afforded First Amend-
ment protections. The Court stated:
Probably never before in the history of this country has it been seriously
contended that the whole punitive power of the government for acts, recog-
nized by the general consent of the Christian world in modern times as
proper matters for prohibitory legislation, must be suspended in order that
the tenets of a religious sect encouraging crime may be carried out without
hindrance.
Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 342-43. As examples, the Court noted that extramarital sexual intercourse
and human sacrifices would be punishable regardless of whether one's "religion" con-
doned or encouraged such acts. Id. at 343.
The Court reiterated similar sentiments in Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990). Pursuant to state law, peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, was classified
as an illegal narcotic. Id. at 874-75. Respondents, upon being fired from their employ-
ment for ingesting the drug, argued that the drug was used for sacramental purposes
at a religious ceremony, and therefore, the state law banning its use infringed upon
their free exercise rights. Id. at 874. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, ruled that
the state law, which prohibited all uses of the drug, was constitutional under the
First Amendment. Id. at 890.
107. 283 U.S. 605 (1931). For additional analysis of Macintosh, see Bergeron, supra
note 65, at 370.
108. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 626. For a further discussion of Macintosh, see White-
head & Conlan, supra note 87, at 9.
109. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 625-26.
110. Id. at 626 (emphasis added). For additional analysis of Macintosh, see Toward
a Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra note 67, at 1060-61.
111. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 612.
[Vol. 21: 477, 1994] Government's Denigration of Religion
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
In 1961, the Supreme Court reevaluated its substantive/ theistic defi-
nition of religion in the landmark case of Torcaso v. Watkins."' Pursu-
ant to existing Maryland state law, state officials were required to de-
clare a belief in the existence of God."3 The plaintiff, Torcaso, was not
allowed to serve as a Notary Public because he refused to declare such
a belief."4 On appeal, Torcaso argued that the Maryland state law vio-
lated the First Amendment."r2
The Supreme Court ruled that the Maryland law did unconstitutional-
ly violate Torcaso's freedom of religion under the First Amendment."'
In its decision, the Court abandoned the Davis substantive approach
and moved toward a functional definition of religion."7 The Court
ruled that the term religion did not solely apply to those beliefs which
were based upon the existence of a deity."' The Court stated that nei-
ther the state, nor the Federal government, "can aid those religions
based upon a belief in the existence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs." 9
3. The Existing Functional Approach
In 1965, the Supreme Court abandoned its earlier substantive/theistic
approach entirely and formulated a true functional definition of religion
112. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred. Id. at 489-96. For additional analysis of
Torcaso in light of previous Supreme Court decisions, see Allen L. Burreson, Note,
Constitutionality of State Requirement That Public Officers Declare Belief in the
Existence of God, 31 U. CIN. L. REV. 88 (1962).
113. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489 (citing Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights of the
Maryland Constitution which provided in relevant part, "[N]o religious test ought ever
to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, other
than a declaration of belief in the existence of God.").
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 496.
117. Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1624; see
also Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra note 67, at 1063 (provid-
ing additional analysis of Torcaso and noting that Torcaso himself was a Secular
Humanist).
118. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 & n.j1 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that
there are many widely accepted religions in this country that do not advocate the
existence of God. Id. at 495 n.ll. The Court gave examples of such religions which
include "Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, [and] Secular Humanism." Id.(emphasis
added).
119. Id. at 495 & n.11.
in United States v. Seeger.2' Pursuant to section 60) of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act,'21 an individual was exempt from
the existing military draft if he conscientiously objected to participation
in war by reason of his "religious training and beliefs."'22 The Act de-
fined the term "religious training and belief" as "an individual's belief in
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation, but not including essentially political, socio-
logical, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. " "2
Such a definition "arguably gave a preference to those who believed in
a traditional God over those who did not."24
In Seeger, three defendants, Seeger, Jakobson, and Peter, petitioned
their local draft board for conscientious objector status.'2 5 Seeger de-
clared that he was opposed to war by reason of his religious beliefs. '26
As to his belief in a Supreme Being, however, Seeger stated that he
wished to leave that question open.'27 Seeger declared "that his was a
belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a
religious faith in a purely ethical creed."'"
Jakobson also declared that he was opposed to war by reason of his
religious beliefs."2 "[H]e defined religion as the 'sum and essence of
one's basic attitudes to the fundamental problems of human exis-
tence.' ""l Jakobson stated that "he believed in a 'Supreme Being' who
was 'Creator of Man' in the sense of being 'ultimately responsible for
120. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at
164-88. Justice Douglas filed a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 188-93. For addi-
tional analysis of Seeger, see Developments in the Law--Religion and the State, su-
pra note 66, at 1625-31 (discussing case law relevant to Seeger); Gail W. Sweeney,
Comment, Conscientious Objection and the First Amendment, 14 AKRON L REV. 71,
74-75 (1980) (discussing the Seeger decision); Robert L. Rabin, When Is a Religious
Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL
L. Q. 231, 231-46 (1966) (arguing that the constitutional definition of religion must be
construed in accordance with Seeger so as to avoid infringing the rights of those
professing a belief in unorthodox faiths); Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 13-
15 (analyzing Seeger's impact on conscientious objector status applications).
121. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456 (1958).
122. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 164-65 (citing 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560)) (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 165 (citing 50 U.S.C. app. § 456Q)) (emphasis added). The term "Su-
preme Being," which was the center of the controversy in Seeger, was deleted in an
amendment to the Act in 1967. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 336 n.2 (1970).
124. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 338.
125. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166-69.
126. Id. at 166.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 167.
130. Id. at 168.
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the existence of man' and who was 'the Supreme Reality' of which 'the
existence of man is the result.'" 3 '
Although Peter also declared that he was opposed to war by reason
of his "religious" beliefs, he affirmatively stated that he was not a mem-
ber of a recognized religious sect or organization."= He decided to de-
fine religion as "'the consciousness of some power manifest in nature
which helps man in the ordering of his life in harmony with its de-
mands."
133
The district court denied all three petitions solely on the basis that
their alleged religious convictions were not based upon a belief in a
Supreme Being.'" Subsequently, all three defendants were convicted
of refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces." In a con-
solidated appeal, the defendants argued that the Act violated their First
Amendment rights because it failed to exempt "nonreligious conscien-
tious objectors.""
The Supreme Court ruled that all three defendants "clearly" qualified
as conscientious objectors under the Act."7 In its decision, the Court
refused to interpret the term "Supreme Being," as required by the Act,
to mean a theistic belief or a belief in an orthodox God.'" Instead, the
Court interpreted the term as requiring a belief in a "broader concept of
a power or being, upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon
which all else is ultimately dependent." 9 The logical conclusion
drawn from Seeger is that a disbelief in God "is irrelevant to First
Amendment considerations."'4 ° Such a definition of religion marked a
significant "break with early Supreme Court cases that defined religion
as man's relationship to his Creator."'
131. Id. at 167. Jakobson might be classified as a deist. A deist is a person who
believes in a God sufficiently powerful and intelligent to bring the world into exis-
tence, but who no longer intervenes in the affairs of humankind. See SMITH, supra
note 50, at 99 (analyzing nonbiblical views of creation). Smith suggests that some of
the most influential founding fathers of this country, including Thomas Jefferson and
Thomas Paine, were deists. Id.
132. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 169.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 166-69.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 165.
137. Id. at 185-88.
138. Id. at 174-76.
139. Id. at 176.
140. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 15.
141. Id. (providing a comparative analysis of Seeger and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
In Seeger, the Court set forth what can be classified as a subjective
or functional approach for determining the requisite "religious be-
lief."42 The Court determined that a person's belief can be classified
as religious if such belief is "sincere and meaningful... which occupies
in the life of its possessor, a place parallel to that filled by the God of
those admittedly qualifying for the exemption."" The Court restated
its position by adding that the requisite "religious belief" required that
the registrant profess a sincere and meaningful belief which is religious
"in his own scheme of things."'44 Therefore, one could argue that "a
'belief is constitutionally protected if it is in a 'parallel position' to that
of a belief in the traditional theistic concept of God."'45
The Seeger Court's broad approach took into account the expanding
religious beliefs and perspectives in this country.'46 The Court noted
that a broad construction of religion would avoid the problems of clas-
sifying varying religious beliefs differently, thus resulting in the accep-
tance of some beliefs and the exclusion of others. 7 In an attempt to
embrace the "ever-broadening understanding of the modem religious
community,""4 the Court stated that the term "religious belief' includ-
ed "'intensely personal' convictions which some might find
'incomprehensible' or 'incorrect.'"'49
In 1970, the Supreme Court expanded upon the Seeger functional
approach in Welsh v. United States.5" Similar to the facts of
Seeger,' the defendant, Welsh, petitioned his local draft board for
conscientious objector status on the basis of his religious beliefs.52
Welsh stressed that his beliefs were not religious." However, Welsh
333, 341 (1890)).
142. See Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1625.
143. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
144. Id. at 185.
145. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 14.
146. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
147. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180.
148. Id.
149. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970) (citing Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184-
85). In support of its extremely broad view of the term "religious," the Court quoted
Dr. David Saville Muzzey, a leader of the Ethical Culture Movement, who stated that
a belief in God "'is anthropocentric, not theocentric. Religion, for all the various deft-
nitions that have been given of it, must surely mean the devotion of man to the
highest ideal that he can conceive.'" Seeger, 380 U.S. at 183 (quoting DAVID S.
MUZZEY, ETHics AS A RELIGION 95 (1951)).
150. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). For additional analysis of Welsh see Sweeney, supra note
120, at 75-77; Jay R. Dingledy, Note, Welsh v. United States: A New Substantive Defi-
nition for Conscientious Objectors, 32 OHIO ST. L J. 653 (1971).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 120-36.
152. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336.
153. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
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refused to submit to the draft because he believed that the taking of
another's life was "immoral and totally repugnant.""s Welsh's petition
was denied and he was subsequently convicted for refusing to submit
to induction into the armed forces."n On appeal, Welsh argued that
section 60) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act exempted
him from combat service."5
In a plurality decision,57 the Court ruled that Welsh was entitled to
conscientious objector status." In its decision, the Court revisited and
expanded upon the Seeger approach.59 The Court emphasized that in
order to determine whether Welsh qualified for the exception, the Court
must "'decide whether the beliefs professed by [Welsh] are sincerely
held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious.'"."
The Court ruled that the "reference to the registrant's 'own scheme of
things' was intended to indicate that the central consideration in deter-
mining whether the registrant's beliefs are religious is whether these
beliefs play the role of a religion and function as a religion in the
registrant's life." 6'
The Court further ruled that purely ethical and moral considerations
can be religious."' The Court stated that Welsh would be denied the
exception only if his system of beliefs did "not rest at all upon moral,
ethical, or religious principles but instead rests solely upon consider-
ations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency. " "63
154. Id. at 343.
155. Id. at 335. Refusal to submit to induction into the Armed Forces was classified
as a felony pursuant to 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a). Id.
156. Id.; see also supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
157. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall joined. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 335-44. Justice Harlan issued a sepa-
rate concurring opinion. Id. at 344-67. Justice White authored a dissenting opinion
which was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Stewart. Id. at 367-74. Justice
Blackmun took no part in the consideration of the case. Id. at 344.
158. Id. at 343.
159. See supra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
160. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339 (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185
(1965)).
161. Id. at 339.
162. Id. at 342-43; see also Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra
note 67, at 1065.
163. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 34243; see also Toward a Constitutional Definition of Reli-
gion, supra note 67, at 1065 (providing additional analysis of the Welsh decision).
But see Eric C. Freed, Comment, Secular Humanism, the Establishment Clause, and
Public Education, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1161 (1986) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
The Court's rulings in both Seeger and Welsh lead one to believe that
the Court has adopted an extremely broad interpretation of the concept
of religion.' u The Court's decision in Welsh, which stressed that even
the claimant's own characterization of his beliefs is not determinative in
assessing whether those beliefs are religious, evidences such a conclu-
sion.'6' The Court ruled that Welsh's beliefs were religious despite
Welsh himself being very explicit in insisting that his beliefs were not
religious.'
It should be noted that both Seeger and Welsh addressed the meaning
of religion in terms of statutory construction rather than directly ad-
dressing the meaning of religion as used in the First Amendment. 67
However, these cases indirectly support a subjective, functional ap-
proach to the definition of religion for First Amendment purposes.'"
In fact, the concurring opinions in both Seeger and Welsh support the
conclusion that the analysis set forth in both cases applies equally to
the meaning of religion in the First Amendment context.66 In Seeger,
Justice Douglas concurred in the Court's opinion and noted that the Act
would have violated the First Amendment if the Court had not con-
strued the term religion as broadly as it did.70 In Welsh, Justice Harlan
concurred in the Court's ruling because he believed that the Act, "limit-
ing [the] draft exception to those opposed to war ... because of theis-
tic beliefs, runs afoul of the religious clauses of the First Amend-
ment.' 7 '
U.S. 205 (1972)) (arguing that the Yoder Court implied that "moral and ethical princi-
pals, in and of themselves, are [not] protected by the religion clauses of the First
Amendment").
164. See Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1625.
165. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341. In support of its position, the Court noted that few
people "are fully aware of the broad scope of the word 'religious.'" Id.
166. Id. Welsh went as far as to strike out the word "religious" from his petition
and "characterized his beliefs as having been formed 'by reading in the fields of his-
tory and sociology.'" Id.
167. Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1625. But
see Rabin, supra note 120 (arguing that the constitutional definition of religion must
be construed in accordance with Seeger so as to avoid infringing the rights of those
professing a belief in unorthodox faiths).
168. Developments in the Law-Z-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1625; see
also supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
169. See Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra note 67, at 1064.
170. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188 (1965). (Douglas, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Douglas also stated that a narrow definition of religion "would also result in a
denial of equal protection by preferring some religions over others." Id. (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
171. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 345. (Harlan, J., concurring). For additional analysis of con-
scientious objection and its impact on First Amendment interpretation, see generally
Sweeney, supra note 120.
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IV. SECULAR HUMANISM IS A RELIGION FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PURPOSES
A. Secular Humanism Comports with the Court's Definition
of Religion
In Seeger and Welsh, the Supreme Court established an informal defi-
nition of religion for First Amendment purposes.' 2 At the same time,
the Court developed several guidelines for determining whether a given
set of beliefs should be classified as either religious or non-religious.
First, in determining whether beliefs can be classified as religious in
nature, theism is essentially irrelevant.' 3 A religion can be based upon
either theistic or non-theistic beliefs."4 Those beliefs, however, must
be based upon moral or ethical considerations.'6 Second, a set of be-
liefs can be classified as religious if they are (1) sincere and meaningful
to the individual and (2) occupy a place parallel to that filled by a tradi-
tional theistic religion in an ,individual's life.' 6 Third, the Court gives
great weight to the declarant's own subjective characterization of his
beliefs as being religious.' However, the declarant's characterization
172. See Toscano, supra note 67, at 178-82, 200-02 (arguing that religion should be
broadly defined so as to encompass both theistic and non-theistic beliefs).
173. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176. Pursuant to the Universal Military Training and Service
Act, an individual was exempt from the existing draft if he conscientiously objected
to participation in war by reason of his religious training and beliefs. Id. at 164 (cit-
ing 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560)). The Act specifically defined "religious training and belief'
as "an individual's belief in a relationship to a Supreme Being." Id. (citing 50 U.S.C.
app. § 456(j)). Three individual defendants, Seeger, Jakobsen, and Peter, petitioned
their local draft board for conscientious objector status on the basis of their "reli-
gious beliefs." Id. at 166-69. Seeger and Peter affirmatively stated that they did not
believe in the existence of a "Supreme Being." Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled
that all three defendants qualified as conscientious objectors under the Act. Id. at
163. The Court refused to interpret the term "Supreme Being" as requiring a belief in
an orthodox God. Id. at 140. For a more detailed discussion of Seeger, see Whitehead
& Conlan, supra note 87, at 14-15; supra notes 120-49 and accompanying text.
174. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176. The Court held that a person's beliefs can be classified
as religious if those beliefs are "sincere and meaningful . . .which occup[y] in the
life of its possessor, a place parallel to that filled by the God of those [who profess
a belief in a Supreme Being]." Id.
175. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342-43. The Court ruled that in order for a person's beliefs
to be classified as religious, the individual's beliefs must rest upon "moral, ethical, or
religious principles," rather than upon "policy, pragmatism, or expediency." Id. For a
more detailed discussion of Welsh, see Toward a Constitutional Definition of Reli-
gion, supra note 67, at 1065; supra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
176. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176, 187; see also Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at
14 (providing additional analysis of Seeger).
177. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184.
of his own beliefs, alone, will not be determinative. ' If the declarant's
beliefs occupy the requisite parallel position, those beliefs can be
classified as religious in nature despite the declarant's own character-
ization that his beliefs are not religious.'79
In expanding upon the beliefs and tenets of Secular Humanism as set
forth in Section II,'" it is apparent that Secular Humanism is a religion
which should be subject to the same First Amendment protections and
prohibitions as are afforded and imposed upon traditional or theistic
religions.
1. Secular Humanism is a Non-Theistic Religion
In contrast to most orthodox religions, Secular Humanism is non-
theistic in nature.' "However, while Secular Humanism is non-theis-
tic, it is religious because it directs itself toward religious beliefs and
practices. ... "" "Both humanism and theism worship their own
'god.""' Whereas theism worships a Deity or Creator as the source of
all knowledge and truth, Secular Humanism worships Man as the
source of all knowledge and truth. '
In 1933, the American Humanist Association" drafted The Human-
ist Manifesto (hereinafter Manifesto I). This document sets forth
178. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341. The Court ruled that an individual's characterization of
his own beliefs would not be determinative in assessing whether those beliefs are
religious. Id. In support of its position, the Court noted that few "are aware of the
broad scope of the word 'religious.'" Id.
179. Id. In Welsh, Welsh petitioned his local draft board for conscientious objector
status on the basis of his religious beliefs. Id. at 336. However, Welsh stressed that
his beliefs were not religious, going so far as to strike the word "religious" from his
petition. Id. at 341 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the Court ruled that Welsh's be-
liefs were religious despite Welsh's express insistence to the contrary. Id.
180. See supra notes 20-64 and accompanying text.
181. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 30. The term "non-theistic" refers to a
religious belief which is not founded upon a belief in a deity. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 30-31.
185. The American Humanist Association has been labeled as "the church of Secular
Humanism in this country today [which] recognizes [Secular Humanism] as a kind of
religion." Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 961 (S.D. Ala.) (examin-
ing expert testimony as to the precise meaning of Secular Humanism), rev'd, 827 F.2d
684 (11th Cir. 1987).
186. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 11. Thirty-five members of the American Humanist
Association, including Columbia University professor John Dewey, one of the most
influential philosophers in American history, and Lester Mondale, half-brother of Wal-
ter Mondale, Vice President of the United States under President Jimmy Carter,
signed Manifesto I. Id. at 13. Dewey insisted that the purpose of the Secular Human-
ist movement and Manifesto I was "to found a new religion, a religion to supplant
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the beliefs, or the official creed, of Secular Humanism." Manifesto I
expressly identifies Secular Humanism as "religious."'88 The religious
nature of the document is evident in its preface which reads:
In order that religious humanism may better be understood we, the undersigned,
desire to make certain affirmations which we believe the facts of our contempo-
rary life demonstrate.
Today man's larger understanding of the universe, his scientific achievements, and
his deeper appreciation of brotherhood, have created a situation which requires a
new statement of the means and purposes of religion .... [I1t is... obvious that
any religion that can hope to be a synthesizing and dynamic force today must be
shaped for the needs of this age. To establish such a religion is a major necessi-
ty of the present.tm
Manifesto I sets forth the major tenets of the religion of Secular Hu-
manism. These tenets include:
Religious humanists regard the universe as self-existing and not created.
Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe depicted by modem science
makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of human values.
Religious humanism considers the complete realization of human personality to be
the end of man's life and seeks its development and fulfillment in the here and
now.
In the place of the old attitudes involved in worship and prayer the humanist finds
his religious emotions expressed in the heightened sense of personal life and in a
cooperative effort to promote social well-being."m
Manifesto I clearly rejects any form of theism and denies the existence
of a supernatural deity. 9' Manifesto I further states that "'[tihe distinc-
tion between the sacred and the secular can no longer be main-
tained.' ' 1 "This synthesis of the sacred and the secular produces the
religion of Secular Humanism." "
In 1973, the Association issued The Humanist Manifesto II (hereinaf-
ter Manifesto I/)."9 This document reasserts many of the claims set
earlier religions." Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 969 (analyzing the issue of whether Secular
Humanism is a religion).
187. HrrcHCOCK, supra note 5, at 11.
188. Id. Hence, the reason why Secular Humanism is also referred to as "religious
humanism." Id.
189. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 34 (quoting HUMANIST MANIFESTO I AND
HUMANIST MANIFESTO II 7-8 (1973)) (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
190. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 11 (quoting HUMANIST MANIFESTO I).
191. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 34.
192. Id. (quoting HUMANIST MANIFESTO I AND HUMANIST MANIFESTO II 8 (1973)).
193. Id.
194. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 13-14.
forth in Manifesto I and notes that, while religious in nature, Secular Hu-
manism is in opposition to traditional theism.'95 Manifesto II "emphasiz-
es the Man-centeredness of Secular Humanism as opposed to the God-
centeredness of traditional theism" by stating "that as 'non-theists, we
begin with humans, not God, nature not deity.""'
Manifesto II also expounds that Secular Humanism is a moral creed.
Manifesto II advocates a program of moral education as a means of
developing moral and social awareness and the capacity for free
choice. 7 Paul Kurtz," one of the drafters of Manifesto II, stated that
Secular Humanism represents "a dominant, moral, and religious point of
view in the scientific age among the intellectuals and educated
classes.""
The great significance of Manifesto II is the considerably longer and
more influential list of signers.' This list includes, among others, noted
author Isaac Asimov, prominent Soviet scientist Andrei Sakharov, Edd
Doerr, director of the organization Americans United For Separation of
Church and State, influential psychologist B.F. Skinner, Lawrence Lader,
chairman of the National Association for Repeal of Abortion Laws, Betty
Friedan, founder of the National Organization of Women, and A. Philip
Randolph, a longtime labor and civil rights leader."' In addition, "[tihe
religious nature of... Manifesto II is affirmed by the fact that one hun-
dred and seventy of its signatories were ministers of the Unitarian-Uni-
versalist Church and many were members of the Fellowship of Religious
Humanists."2 2
The list of signers is critical in two respects. First, the length of the list
indicates that the number of individuals who subscribe to the creed had
greatly increased, especially during the 1960s.' Second, a number of
those who subscribe to the creed are in highly sensitive areas of life with
"tremendous personal and intellectual influence ... [and] the means to
influence public opinion."204
195. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 34-35.
196. Id. at 36 (citing HUMANIST MANIFESTO I AND HUMANIST MANIFESTO II 16 (1973)).
197. See HUMANIST MANIFESTO I AND HUMANIST MANIFESTO II 19 (1973); see also,
WEBBER, supra note 23, at 43.
198. See supra note 62.
199. Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 965 (S.D. Ala.) (Kurtz pro-
viding expert testimony as to whether Secular Humanism is a religion), rev'd, 827
F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
200. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 14-15.
201. Id.
202. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 35 n.184.
203. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 15; see supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text
(discussing the development of the Secular Humanist movement).
204. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 15.
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On the bases of Manifesto I and Manifesto II, and the stated beliefs of
those who profess to be Secular Humanists, Secular Humanism can be
classified as a non-theistic religion. Although the courts and commenta-
tors have provided little support for such a conclusion, ' this position
seems viable, especially in light of the expansive approach the Supreme
Court has taken in defining the term religion.'
In Seeger, the Court ruled that Seeger's beliefs were sufficiently reli-
gious to qualify him for a conscientious objector exemption.' Seeger
himself stated that his beliefs were (1) religious in nature, (2) based
upon a "devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes and a reli-
gious faith in a purely ethical creed," and (3) based upon an "ethical
belief in intellectual and moral integrity without belief in God."'
There are striking similarities between Seeger's beliefs and the stated
beliefs of Secular Humanism as set forth in Manifesto I and Manifesto IL
First, Manifesto I emphasizes that Secular Humanism is a religion.2"
The preface and the body of Manifesto I are replete with references to
the religious nature of Secular Humanism." ' In addition, John
Dewey, " one of Manifesto 's signatories, stressed that the purpose of
205. See generally Toscano, supra note 67 (arguing that Secular Humanism is a
religion for First Amendment purposes); Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87
(postulating the theory that the American religious base has shifted from traditional
theism to Secular Humanism). But see Freed, supra note 163, at 1173-89 (arguing that
whether Secular Humanism can be classified as a religion may be irrelevant for First
Amendment analysis)..
206. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
207. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). For a detailed discussion of
Seeger, see supra notes 120-49 and accompanying text.
208. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166 (emphasis added).
209. Manifesto I expressly identifies Secular Humanism as "religious." Manifesto I
states in pertinent part:
"In order that religious humanism may better be understood, we, the under-
signed, desire to make certain affirmations which we believe the facts of our
contemporary life demonstrate.
Today man's larger understanding of the universe, his scientific achievements,
and his deeper appreciation of brotherhood, have created a situation which
requires a new statement of the means and purposes of religion .... [I]t
is . . . obvious that any religion that can hope to be a synthesizing and
dynamic force today must be shaped for the needs of this age. To establish
such a religion is a major necessity of the present."
Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 34 (quoting HUMANIST MANIFESTO I AND HUMAN-
iST MANIFESTO II 7-8 (1973)) (emphasis added).
210. Id.
211. See supra note 186.
Manifesto I was to establish a new religion."2 These characterizations
deserve a substantial amount of consideration because the Court in
Seeger stated that an individual's "characterization of his own belief as
'religious' should be given great weight.""' Second, Manifesto I sets
forth an ethical creed by proclaiming that the purpose of Secular Human-
ism is to establish "a cooperative effort to promote social well-being.""4
Third, Manifesto I clearly states that Secular Humanism is not based
upon a belief in God."5.
In Welsh, Welsh argued that his convictions were based upon a sense
of ethics and morality."' The Court ruled that these convictions were
sufficiently religious in nature to qualify Welsh for a conscientious objec-
tor, exemption."7
There are also marked similarities between the beliefs held by Welsh
and the stated beliefs of Secular Humanism. Manifesto II clearly asserts
that Secular Humanism is a creed based upon ethical and moral consid-
erations. First, the very language of Manifesto II emphasizes the moral
and ethical nature of Secular Humanism. Manifesto II states:
We affirm that moral values derive their source from human experiences. Ethics
is autonomous and situational needing no theological or ideological sanction ....
The principle of moral equality must be furthered through elimination of all dis-
crimination based upon race, religion, sex, age, or national origin .... We are
212. Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 969 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827
F.2d 684 (lth Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). Dewey insisted that the purpose of the
Secular Humanist movement and Manifesto I was "to found a new religion, a religion
to supplant earlier religions." Id.
213. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965).
214. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 34 (citing HUMANIST MANIFESTO I AND
HUMANIST MANIFESTO II (1973)).
215. Manifesto I states in pertinent part:
Religious humanists regard the universe as self-existing and not created.
Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe depicted by modern science
makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of human val-
ues.
Religious humanism considers the complete realization of human personality
to be the end of man's life and seeks its development and fulfillment in the
here and now.
In the place of the old attitudes involved in worship and prayer the humanist
finds his religious emotions expressed in the heightened sense of personal
life and in a cooperative effort to promote social well-being.
HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 11 (quoting HUMANIST MANIFESTO. I) (emphasis added); see
also Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 11.
216. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1970). Welsh emphasized that his
beliefs were not religious. Id. at 336. Instead, he "characterized his beliefs as having
been formed 'by reading in the fields of history and sociology.'" Id. at 341. On this
basis, Welsh refused to submit to the draft because he believed that the taking of
another's life was "immoral and totally repugnant." Id. at 343.
217. Id. at 343-44.
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concerned for the welfare of the aged, infirm, the disadvantaged, and also for the
outcasts-the mentally retarded, abandoned or abused children, the handicapped,
prisoners, and addicts-for al who are neglected or ignored by society."1 8
Manifesto II further emphasizes "moral education" as a means of achiev-
ing social awareness and harmony."9 This very language clearly estab-
lishes that Secular Humanism is intended as a creed based upon morali-
ty. Second, Paul Kurtz,"o one of the drafters of Manifesto II, admitted
that Secular Humanism is based upon doctrines of religion and morali-
ty.' Therefore, based upon these analogies and the Court's rulings in
both Seeger and Welsh, Secular Humanism is arguably a non-theistic
religion for First Amendment purposes.
2. Secular Humanism is "Parallel" to Theism
In Seeger and Welsh, the Supreme Court ruled that beliefs can be clas-
sified as religious in nature if those beliefs are (1) sincere and meaning-
ful to the individual and (2) occupy a place parallel to that filled by a
traditional theistic religion in the individual's life.' The first prong, the
sincere and meaningful requirement, is a subjective test.' There is ev-
ery indication that those who profess to be Secular Humanists are sin-
cere in their beliefs. This sincerity is evidenced by several factors. First,
Secular Humanists have established an official creed in the form of Man-
ifesto I and Manifesto II. This creed sets forth a world view and a
way of life.' Second, Secular Humanists have established organizations
which promulgate and proselytize the Secular Humanist faith." Third,
218. KuRTz, supra note 62, at 42-44 (quoting HUMANIST MANIFESTO I).
219. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 62.
221. Smith v. Board of Sch..Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 965 (S.D. Ala.) (Kurtz pro-
viding expert testimony as to whether Secular Humanism is a religion), rev'd, 827
F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987). Kurtz stated that Secular Humanism represents a
'dominant, moral, and religious point of view in the scientific age among the intellec-
tuals and educated classes." Id.
222. See supra notes 143-45 and 160-61 and accompanying text.
223. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166-67 (1965). The Court inferred
that the determination of whether a declarant's beliefs are sincere and meaningful is
a question for the trier of fact to answer based upon the declarant's demeanor. Id.
224. See supra notes 186-202 and accompanying text.
225. See generally KURrz, supra note 62 (examining the tenets of Secular Humanism
from the perspective of a self-proclaimed Secular Humanist). See also Freed, supra
note 163, at 1168-69 (stating that Secular Humanism answers many ultimate and fun-
damental questions of life, such as the purpose and meaning of life).
226. See infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
the number of self-proclaimed Secular Humanists has been steadily ris-
ingY In the United States, approximately ten thousand people officially
belong to humanist organizations." However, the actual number of hu-
manists throughout America may range in the millions. 9
The second prong, the parallel position requirement, can be summarily
dismissed. In Welsh, the Court ruled that "[ilf an individual deeply and
sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and
content,... those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual 'a
place parallel to that filled by... God' in traditionally religious per-
sons." ' ° As indicated above, Secular Humanism is based upon ethical
and moral beliefs, and those beliefs are sincerely held by its follow-
ers.2a
The second prong need not be so readily dismissed, however, because
there is great evidence which indicates that Secular Humanism does hold
such a parallel position in the lives of those who proclaim to be Secular
Humanists. Dr. Russell Kirk 2 argues that the tenets of Secular Human-
ism, as set forth in Manifesto I and Manifesto II, fall within the limits of
a modem definition of religion which recognizes both theistic and non-
theistic beliefs.' Kirk notes that there are many similarities between
Secular Humanism and Christianity "insofar as [Secular Humanism] is
organized as a body of belief, as a body of doctrine, preaches an ethical
creed, and proselytizes."' Kirk further analogizes Secular Humanism
and Christianity by stating:
Christians immanentize symbols of transcendence by claiming that one enters
upon immortality through perfection in grace in death. Secularists immanentize
this by bringing the issue down to this world, and... instead of salvation through
grace in death, the secularists achieve the perfection of society here in this
world!'
227. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
228. See KuRZ, supra note 62, at 6.
229. Id.
230. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
231. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
232. Dr. Kirk's credentials include an M.A. degree from Duke University. Kirk holds
honorary doctoral degrees from Boston College, St. John's University, Park College,
Lemoyne College, Loyola College, Niagara University, Gannon University, Albion Col-
lege, Olivet College, Central Michigan University, Pepperdine University, and Grand
Valley State College.
233. Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 968 (S.D. Ala.) (analyzing
testimony on the issue of whether Secular Humanism is a religion), rev'd, 827 F.2d
684 (11th Cir. 1987).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 968-69.
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Author Paul Kurtz,' a leading figure in the Secular Humanist move-
ment, has written numerous works expanding upon the declarations and
beliefs of Secular Humanism.? Kurtz characterizes Secular Humanism
as an outlook on man and nature, a method of inquiry, and a set of mor-
al values.' Contrary to popular misconceptions, Kurtz stresses that
Secular Humanism is not simply a political ideology.'
Kurtz describes the American Humanist Association in a manner which
suggests that the philosophy and function of the Association is similar to
that of a traditional theological organization.24" Kurtz asserts that:
[Tihe function of the Association is to extend its principles and operate education-
ally. This association publishes books, magazines, and pamphlets; engages lectur-
ers; selects, trains, and accredits humanistic counselors as its ordained ministry of
the movement; forms and charters local or area chapters as an integral part of the
association; holds seminars, institutes, and conferences; utilizes the mass media;
and affiliates and cooperates for mutual and increased service with other associa-
tions, churches and societies.241
Kurtz also states that the Association has "undertaken efforts to obtain
First Amendment constitutional immunities and the protections afforded
theistic religions. " " Kurtz also notes that the Association "certifies hu-
manist counselors who enjoy the legal status of ordained priests, pastors,
and rabbis.""3 In addition, Kurtz cites an article appearing in the 1983
Humanist Magazine that stated:
"I am convinced that the battle for human kind's future must be waged and won
in the public school classroom by teachers who correctly perceive their role as
proselytizers of a new faith, a religion of humanity .... These teachers must be
ministers of another sort, utilizing a classroom instead of a pulpit to convey hu-
manist values in whatever subject they teach regardless of the grade lev-
el .... "'
236. See supra note 62. Dr. Kurtz's credentials include an M.A. degree and a Ph.D.
degree from Columbia University. Kurtz is presently working in the Department of
Philosophy at the State University of New York, Buffalo.
237. Kurtz's works include IN DEFENSE OF SECULAR HUMANISM (1983), EXUBERANCE
(1977), THE FULLNESS OF LIFE (1974), and DECISION AND THE CONDITION OF MAN
(1968). Kurtz has also been the editor of FREE INQUIRY and THE HUMANIST. See also
Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 964-70 (Kurtz testifying as to the meaning of Secular Human-
ism).
238. KURTZ, supra note 62, at 8-9.
239. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
240. See Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 970 (Kurtz providing expert testimony as to the
meaning of Secular Humanism).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 969 (citation omitted by the court) (emphasis added). It is the author's
Based on the above commentaries, there can be no doubt that the
followers of the Secular Humanist faith hold their religious beliefs in a
sincere and meaningful manner. Further, a strong argument can be made
that the Secular Humanist faith parallels traditional theistic religion in
the lives of those who proclaim to be Secular Humanists. Therefore, in
terms of First Amendment analysis, Secular Humanism arguably satisfies
the Seeger and Welsh "parallel position" requirement."s
3. Independent Characterizations are Irrelevant in Determining the
Status of Secular Humanism
There is great divisiveness among Secular Humanists as to whether
Secular Humanism is a religion. Members of the American Humanist
Association are apparently split as to whether Secular Humanism espous-
es principles which can be labeled as religious.us On one hand, many
members argue that Secular Humanism is only a scientific method "with-
out preconceptions of a religious nature."247 Other members, however,
including John Dewey,s have stressed that Secular Humanism is reli-
gious in nature."s In fact, Charles Reams, president of the Washington,
D.C. chapter of the Humanist Association, "applauded the United States
Commission on Civil Rights for its finding that the Association of Hu-
manists was a religious minority."
250
This ongoing debate, however, is practically irrelevant in the determi-
nation of whether Secular Humanism is a religion for First Amendment
purposes. In Seeger, the Supreme Court ruled that an individual's "char-
acterization of his own beliefs as 'religious' should carry great
opinion that this excerpt exemplifies a major hypocrisy within the Secular Humanist
movement. Proponents of Secular Humanism portray their faith as accommodating
and tolerant. Kurtz has stated that Secular Humanism is based upon a belief that
"individual freedom is basic: The right of the individual to make up his own mind, to
develop his own conscience and to lead his own life without undue influence from
others." KURTZ, supra note 62, at 8. Kurtz has further stated that Secular Humanists
"believe in democracy and freedom, which requires toleration of different points of
view, as well as criticism of sectarian doctrines." Id. At the same time, Kurtz has
asserted that the "fundamentalist right is radical for attempting to change the politi-
cal, social, and moral structure of American Democracy." Id. at 4. This excerpt, how-
ever, which calls for the wholesale indoctrination of public school children, evidences
a totalitarian philosophy which is far from accommodating and tolerant. In fact, the
concepts embodied within this excerpt are analogous to the beliefs and strategies of
those who Secular Humanists would classify as "radical" or extreme fundamentalists.
245. See supra notes 143-45 and 160-61 and accompanying text.
246. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 969.
247. Id.
248. See supra note 186.
249. See Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 969-70.
250. Id. at 971 (emphasis added).
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weight." " In Welsh, however, the Court ruled that an individual's char-
acterization of his own beliefs as non-religious in nature is not determi-
native.' The Court added that an individual is often not "aware of the
broad scope of the word 'religious,'" and therefore, an individual's state-
ment "that his beliefs are non-religious is a highly unreliable guide."'
Therefore, the opinions of those members of the Association who believe
that Secular Humanism is not a religion, cannot turn that which can
otherwise be classified as a religion, into a non-religion.
B. Courts Have Expressly Defined Secular Humanism as a Religion
for First Amendment Purposes
It is possible to argue that the analysis set forth in Section IV(A) is
untenable because neither Seeger nor Welsh addressed the definition of
religion in a First Amendment context.' In fact, the Supreme Court has
been extremely reluctant to establish a set definition of religion for First
Amendment purposes.' Despite this general reluctance, however, vari-
ous courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have either ex-
pressly stated or inferred that Secular Humanism is a religion for First
Amendment purposes.26
In Smith v. Board of School Commissionersn7 District Court Judge
251. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965).
252. United States v. Welsh, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970). In Welsh, Welsh petitioned his
local draft board for conscientious objector status on the basis of his religious be-
liefs. Id. at 336. However, Welsh stressed that his beliefs were not religious. Id. at
341. In fact, Welsh went as far as to strike the word "religious" from his petition. Id.
Nonetheless, the Court ruled that Welsh's beliefs were religious despite Welsh's in-
sistence to the contrary. Id.
253. Id.
254. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
256. See infra notes 257-81 and accompanying text.
257. 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (1lth Cir. 1987). In Smith,
Judge William B. Hand concluded that Secular Humanism is a religion under the First
Amendment. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 982-83. On that basis, Judge Hand banned the
use of 35 public school textbooks that he believed promoted the religion of Secular
Humanism. Id. at 988-90; see infra notes 258-71 and accompanying text. The Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, but not with respect to Judge Hand's
finding that Secular Humanism is a religion. Smith, 827 F.2d 684. The Court of Ap-
peals ruled that, assuming Secular Humanism is a religion, the materials contained in
the banned textbooks did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 689; see infra
notes 272-75. For a critical analysis of the lower court's decision, see ARVAL A. MOR-
RiS, THE CONSTrTUTION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, 202 (1989).
William B. Hand set forth a very detailed analysis of Secular Humanism
and concluded that Secular Humanism is a religion under the First
Amendment.' The plaintiff, a father of three children attending public
school, filed an action against the Board of School Commissioners of
Mobile County, Alabama, seeking to enjoin the practice of mandatory
prayers in the public schools. 9 The plaintiff argued that this practice
violated the First Amendment.' ° Numerous defendant-intervenors, in-
cluding Smith, requested that the court expand the requested injunction
to include all religious activity in the public schools, including those that
fostered Secular Humanism.!"
Numerous experts from the fields of religion, philosophy, and sociolo-
gy testified as to the meaning of religion and Secular Humanism.' Af-
ter analyzing the testimony, Judge Hand concluded, "For purposes of the
First Amendment, Secular Humanism is a religious belief system, entitled
to the protections of, and subject to the prohibitions of, the religion
clauses."' Judge Hand further ruled that Secular Humanism "is not a
mere scientific methodology that may be promoted and advanced in the
public schools." ' In support of this position, Judge Hand stated that:
All of the experts, and the class representatives, agreed that this belief system is a
religion which makes a statement about supernatural existence a central pillar of
its logic; defines the nature of man; sets forth a goal or purpose for individual and
collective human existence; and defines the nature of the universe, and thereby
delimits its purpose .... In addition, humanism, as a belief system, erects a moral
code and identifies the source of morality.'m
Judge Hand also noted the institutional character of Secular Human-
ism, namely the structure and hierarchy of Secular Humanist organiza-
tions, including the American Humanist Association, the Council for
Democratic and Secular Humanism, and the Fellowship of Religious
Humanists.2" Judge Hand stated that "[t]hese organizations proselytize
and preach their theories with the avowed purpose of persuading non-
adherents to believe as they do."267 Judge Hand concluded that the ac-
tivities and publications of these organizations provide "evidence that
258. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 982-83. But see Freed, supra note 163, at 1159 n.82
(commenting that Judge Hand's predisposition towards defending prayer in public
schools may diminish the weight of the opinion).
259. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 942.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 960-71.
263. Id. at 982.
264. Id. at 982-83.
265. Id. at 980-81.
266. Id. at 981.
267. Id.
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this belief system is similar to groups traditionally afforded protection by
the First Amendment religion clauses. " '
Judge Hand rebuked the argument that Secular Humanism is only a
scientific methodology and not a religion.' 6 Judge Hand reasoned:
For First Amendment purposes, the commitment of humanists to a non-supernatu-
ral and non-transcendent analysis... prevents them from maintaining the fiction
that this is a non-religious discipline .... Secular Humanism is religion for First
Amendment purposes because it makes statements based upon faith-assump-
tions ....
1T]o claim that there is nothing real beyond observable data is to make an
assumption based not on science, but on faith, faith that observable data is all
that is real. A statement that there is no transcendent or supernatural reality is a
religious statement. A statement that there is no scientific proof of supernatural or
transcendent reality is irrelevant and nonsensical, because inquiry into the funda-
mental nature of man and reality itself may not be confined solely within the
sphere of physical, tangible, observable science. To demand that there be physical
proof of the supernatural, and to claim that an apparent lack of proof means the
supernatural cannot be accepted, is to create a religious creed.'
Having concluded that Secular Humanism is a religion, Judge Hand en-
joined the use of thirty-five public school textbooks that he believed
promoted the religion of Secular Humanism.27" '
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision,"' but not
with respect to Judge Hand's finding that Secular Humanism is a religion.
The Court of Appeals assumed that Secular Humanism is a religion, but
ruled that the materials contained within the banned textbooks did not
violate the First Amendment."' The appellate court ruled that the text-
books did not endorse Secular Humanism, but merely instilled such val-
ues as "independent thought, tolerance of diverse views, self-respect,
maturity, self-reliance, and logical decision-making."274 The Court of Ap-
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 982 (footnote omitted).
271. Id. at 988-90. The list of books banned from the schoolroom included: HELEN
McGINLEY, CARING, DECIDING AND GROWING (1983); VERDENE RYDER, CONTEMPORARY
LIVING (1981); JOAN KELLY, TODAY'S TEEN (1981); LEW SMITH, THE AMERICAN DREAM
(1980), HERBERT J. BASs, OUR AMERICAN HERITAGE (1979), and FRANK FREIDEL, AMERI-
CA Is (1978). Id. at 988.
272. Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684 (lth Cir. 1987).
273. Id. at 689.
274. Id. at 692. As will be seen, it is of critical importance to note that not one of
the 35 textbooks contained information on the theory of evolution. See Smith, 655 F.
Supp. at 998-1013.
peals noted that the endorsement of such values established an appropri-
ate secular effect.275
Judge Hand was not the first member of the judiciary to rule that Sec-
ular Humanism is a religion for First Amendment purposes. In Torcaso v.
Watkins,78 the Supreme Court expressly identified Secular Humanism
as a religion.' The Court reasoned that the term religion does not sole-
ly apply to those beliefs based upon the existence of a deity. 8 The
Court emphasized that there are many widely accepted religions in this
country which do not advocate the existence of God.' The Court stat-
ed that such recognized non-theistic religions include "Buddhism, Tao-
ism, Ethical Culture, [and] Secular Humanism." ' The Court ruled that
government cannot "aid theistic religions against non-theistic faiths.""'
Therefore, it is clear that Secular Humanism is a religious belief system
which should be subject to First Amendment protections and prohibi-
tions.
C. A Response to Some Constructive Scholarly Criticism
Some commentators have argued that Secular Humanism cannot, and
should not, be classified as a religion under the First Amendment.'
275. Smith, 827 F.2d at 692; see also Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d
1528, 1534 (9th Cir.) (ruling that a text which questioned the validity of certain reli-
gious beliefs did not establish the religion of Secular Humanism), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 826 (1985).
276. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Pursuant to existing Maryland state law, state officials
were required to declare a belief in the existence of God. Id. at 488. Torcaso was
not allowed to serve as a Notary Public because he refused to declare such a belief.
Id. In fact, it has been suggested that Torcaso, himself, was a Secular Humanist.
Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra note 67, at 1063. Torcaso
argued that the Maryland law violated the First Amendment. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 488.
The Supreme Court ruled that the state law violated Torcaso's freedom of religion
under the First Amendment. Id. at 496.
277. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.11.
278. Id. at 495 & n.11 (emphasis added).
279. Id. at 495 n.11.
280. Id. (emphasis added. But see Freed, supra note 163, at 1153-57 (arguing that
the Court's reference to Secular Humanism is not dispositive because (1) the Su-
preme Court has not established a set definition of Secular Humanism and (2) the
Court's reference to Secular Humanism was only dicta).
281. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495. For additional analysis of Torcaso, see Toward a
Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra note 67, at 1063.
282. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at
1668-74 (noting that it is difficult to sustain a claim that Secular Humanism is a reli-
gion); Freed, supra note 163, at 1170 (arguing that Secular Humanism cannot be
classified as religious in nature when focussing on its external characteristics).
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Such conclusions, however, are usually based upon a wholly inadequate
discussion of the meaning and beliefs of Secular Humanism. For exam-
ple, one commentator defined Secular Humanism as "a receptacle for
grouping, with greater or lesser breadth, those values considered unac-
ceptable to fundamentalist Christianity."' Other commentators define
Secular Humanism as "a term of political polemic, depicting a range of
views on political or social issues, ranging from wealth distribution and
disarmament to homosexual rights and abortion."' As discussed earli-
er,' these overbroad, if not completely false, characterizations are a
product of erroneous portrayals espoused by the media and many com-
mentators. These common misperceptions provide a wholly inadequate
basis for any meaningful First Amendment analysis.
At least one other commentator has taken the position that Secular
Humanism cannot be classified as a religion because the external charac-
teristics of Secular Humanism are not analogous to the characteristics of
other, more traditional, religious organizations.' This argument has
several premises. First, unlike traditional religions, it is argued that Secu-
lar Humanism is without a "sacred text defining [Slecular [H]umanism in
the sense that the Bible informs Christianity or that the Koran informs Is-
lam.""7 Second, it is maintained that no one philosopher has had a
dominant influence in developing the beliefs of Secular Humanism.'
Lastly, it is asserted that Secular Humanism has no "ceremonies, holi-
days, clergy, or formal structure" as do other more traditional reli-
gions.'
Beyond the lack of clear judicial authority, this argument is untenable
in light of a detailed analysis and description of Secular Humanism and
the Secular Humanist movement. As for the first proposition, Secular
Humanism does have a "sacred text" in the form of Manifesto I,' Man-
283. Developments in the Law---Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1669
n.150 (citations omitted).
284. Id. Paul Kurtz, a major figure in the Secular Humanist movement, reveals the
fallacy of this statement by stressing that Secular Humanism is not simply a political
ideology. KURTZ, supra note 62, at 8-9.
285. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
286. Freed, supra note 163, at 1170 (citing Freeman, supra note 67, at 1553).
287. Id. at 1153.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1170.
290. See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
ifesto II, and the Secular Humanist Declaration. 2 These documents
set forth "the official creed" of Secular Humanism."
As for the second position, there are several leading individuals who
have been noted for their work in developing and influencing the Secular
Humanist movement. Included among those individuals are author Paul
Kurtz 4 and philosopher John Dewey. 5 Furthermore, the notion that
a system of beliefs must have one dominant philosopher to be classified
as a religion is completely unfounded. For example, the Old Testament
reveals that Judaism is based upon the teachings of numerous prophets.
As for the final premise, although Secular Humanism may not conduct
official ceremonies in the traditional sense, or recognize any set holidays,
Secular Humanism does employ clergy and does utilize a formal struc-
ture. As noted earlier,"6 Secular Humanist organizations, including the
American Humanist Association, the Council for Democratic and Secular
Humanism, and the Fellowship for Religious Humanities, are similar to
traditional theological organizations in philosophy and function." v These
organizations proselytize their beliefs through certified counselors "who
enjoy the legal status of ordained priests, pastors, and rabbis.""8 These
organizations also form local chapters as a means of disseminating their
views throughout the country.' Upon a detailed analysis of the Secular
Humanist movement, therefore, the position that Secular Humanism is
not a religion because its external characteristics are not analogous to
traditional religious organizations, is simply erroneous.
291. See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
292. See KuRTz, supra note 62, at 14-24.
293. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 11, 14.
294. See supra notes 62, 236-44 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 186, 211-12 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 23244 and accompanying text.
297. Kurtz has stated that:
[O]ne of the functions of the [American Humanist Association] is to extend
its principles and operate educationally. This association publishes books,
magazines, and pamphlets; engages lecturers; selects, trains, and accredits
humanistic counselors as its ordained ministry of the movement; forms and
charters local or area chapters as an integral part of the association; holds
seminars, institutes, and conferences; utilizes the mass media; and affiliates
and cooperates for mutual and increased service with other associations,
churches, and societies.
Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 970 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684
(11th Cir. 1987).
298. Id.
299. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
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V. EVOLUTION IS A FUNDAMENTAL TENET OF SECULAR HUMANISM THAT Is
TAUGHT IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. Evolution's Tumultuous History in the Courts and in the
Classrooms
In 1859, Charles Darwin published his controversial book entitled On
the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection; or, The Preserva-
tion of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life." In this work, Darwin
attempted to explain the origins of mankind." Darwin called his theory
"descent with modification"-a theory that was later labeled as evolu-
tion.12 Darwin's theory advances the presumption that all living things
arose from a single source that developed from inorganic materials.'
The general theory involves large-scale changes, or mutations, in organ-
isms "from single-cell bacteria to complex plants and animals, from fish
to mammals, and from apes to men." '
At this juncture, it is worth noting that many individuals adhere to reli-
gious beliefs that affirm the theory of divine creation."' The theory of
300. See MICHAEL RUSE, THE DARWINIAN REVOLUTION ix (1979).
301. Id.
302. Id. at x. Despite modem misperceptions, Darwin was not the first to posit the
theory of evolution. See ERNAN MCMULLIN, EVOLUTION AND CREATION 3 (1985). The
actual theory can be traced back to early Greek philosophers in the 6th century B.C.
Id.
303. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 47 (quoting G. KERKUT, IMPLICATIONS OF
EVOLUTION 157 (1960)). It is understood that such a broad characterization represents
a gross understatement of the evolutionary theory. A detailed analysis of the theory
of evolution, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. For more detail, see
generally CHARLES DARWIN, THE EXPRESSION OF THE EMOTIONS IN MAN AND ANIMALS
(1872); CHARLES DARWIN, DESCENT OF MAN (1871); CHARLES DARWIN, ORIGIN OF SPECIES
(1859); PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL (1991); MCMULwN, supra note 302; EVo-
LUTION VERSUS CREATIONISM: THE PUBLIC EDUCATION CONTROVERSY (J. Peter Zetterberg
ed., 1983); RUSE, supra note 300.
304. JOHNSON, supra note 303, at 12. It is vital to distinguish between the general
theory of evolution, referred to as macroevolution, and the limited theory of evolu-
tion, or microevolution. Macroevolution is a very speculative theory which posits that
entire levels of higher species have mutated, or "evolved," from lower species.
KERKUT, supra note 303, at 157. Microevolution, on the other hand, advances the
theory "'that many living animals can be observed over the course of time to under-
go changes' through genetic variation and limited mutation." Id.; see also SMITH, su-
pra note 50, at 98 (examining the conflict between creationism and evolution).
The term "evolution" hereinafter refers to the general theory of evolution, or
macroevolution.
305. Wendel R. Bird, Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public
creationism derives from a literal interpretation of the Old Testament
book of Genesis, which asserts that God supernaturally created the earth
and life." Religions founded upon creationism primarily include those
faiths stemming from the Judeo-Christian heritage. 7
Depending upon the way one chooses to characterize the theory of
evolution, Darwin's theory may be in direct conflict with cieationism.'
If evolution is simply defined as a gradual process by which one form of
living creature transforms into another form, no such conflict need
arise.' In this sense, there have been efforts to reconcile evolution
with creationism by asserting that God may have "employed such a grad-
ual process as a means of creation.""' However, a conflict ultimately
arises if evolution is defined in such a way that excludes the possibility
of any supernatural influence?" In this sense, Secular Humanism does
exclude any possibility of supernatural intervention,"2 and therefore,
Secular Humanists must employ this latter definition. It is on this basis
that the theory of evolution becomes antithetical to the theory of
creationism.
Schools, 87 YALE L J. 515, 519 (1978) (arguing that exclusive instruction on the gen-
eral theory of evolution violates the Free Exercise Clause).
306. Id. at 520. See generally Genesis 1-2 (New American Standard Version).
307. Bird, supra note 305, at 519-20.
308. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 47. There is an important distinction
between the theory of creationism and creation science. Creationism relies on a liter-
al interpretation of the book of Genesis. Id. at 47 n.228 (citing Bird, supra note 305,
at 517, 520). For example, creation theory posits that God created Adam and Eve
and that a worldwide flood destroyed all mankind except Noah, his family, and the
animals Noah was able to save. Id. Creation science, although relying on the asser-
tion that a Creator designed the universe, is a theory of the origin of life "that em-
ploys scientific argument and not a sacred text." Id. (citing Bird, supra note 305, at
517). For a more detailed analysis of creationism and creation science, see generally
EVOLUTION VERSUS CREATIONISM: THE PUBLIC EDUCATION CONTROVERSY, supra note 303,
at 113-357; MCMULLIN, supra note 302, at 153-302; Gary C. Leedes, Monkeying Around
With the Establishment Clause and Bashing Creation-Science, 22 U. RICH. L. REV.
149 (1987) (examining the educational value of scientific creationism).
309. JOHNSON, supra note 303, at 3-4.
310. Id. at 4; see also SMITH, supra note 50, at 97. Smith asks, "Couldn't God have
created man through a gradual, evolutionary process?" Id. But see McLean v. Arkan-
sas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259-60 (E.D. Ark. 1982), offd, 723 F.2d 45 (8th
Cir. 1983). Henry M. Morris, director of the Institute for Creation Research (ICR), has
stated that "[ilt is impossible to devise a legitimate means of harmonizing the Bible
with evolution." Id. (citing Henry M. Morris, Evolution and the Bible, in ICR IMPACT
SERIES NUMBER 5 (undated, unpaginated)).
311. JOHNSON, supra note 303, at 4.
312. Manifesto I clearly asserts that "Religious humanists regard the universe as
self-existing and not created. Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe depict-
ed by modem science makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of
human value." HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 11 (emphasis added); see also Whitehead
& Conlan, supra note 87, at 29-37 (defining Secular Humanism).
[Vol. 21: 477, 1994] Government's Denigration of Religion
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
From nearly the moment Darwin announced his theory of evolution to
this very day, great debates have raged over the propriety of teaching
evolution in the public schools."3 Some commentators have argued that
late nineteenth and early twentieth century "Christian fundamentalists,"
who perceived the theory of evolution as the prime cause of a decline in
traditional moral values, fueled the early debates.3"4 Driven by the fear
of this perception, it has been asserted that fundamentalists3 5 waged an
anti-evolution war in the courts and in the state legislatures."6
1. The Infamous "Monkey Trial"-A Fundamentalist Victory
The fundamentalists scored an early victory in 1925 when the Tennes-
see legislature passed a statute which prohibited the teaching of evolu-
tion in public schools.317 The statute, known as the Tennessee Anti-Evo-
lution Act, stated:
[IIt shall be unlawful for any teacher in any of the Universities, normals and all
other public schools of the state which are supported in whole or in part by the
public school funds of the state, to teach any theory that denies the story of di-
313. See Arval A. Morris, Fundamentalism, Creationism and the First Amendment,
41.1 WEsT's EDUC. L. REPORTER 4 (1987), reprinted in ARVAL A. MORRIS, THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 205 (1989). Notably, in California, debates over evo-
lution in public schools continue to rage to this very day. Democrats and Republicans
alike attacked Rob Hurtt, a California Senate candidate, because he openly believes
that creationism should be taught alongside evolution in public schools. Eric Bailey,
Hurtt Gets Closer Scrutiny in 32nd Senate Race, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993, at A5.
California Superintendent of Schools Bill Honig Was convicted on four counts of
conflict of interest for diverting public funds to a consulting firm headed by his wife.
Jean Merl, Honig Conviction Derails a Reform-Minded Career, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31,
1993, at A5. Honig posited the feeble argument that the prosecution was a right-wing
conspiracy to remove him from office because he advocated the teaching of evolution
in public schools. Id. For a detailed history and analysis of the debates over evolu-
tion in the public schools, see generally EVOLUTION VERSUS CREATIONISM: THE PUBLIC
EDUCATION CONTROVERSY, supra note 303; Bird, supra note 305 (arguing that exclusive
instruction in the general theory of evolution violates the Free Exercise Clause).
314. See Morris, supra note 313, at 205.
315. The term "fundamentalist" is broadly defined as one who believes in "a literal
interpretation of the Bible and . . . the inerrancy of the Scriptures." McLean v. Ar-
kansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D. Ark. 1982), offd, 723 F.2d 45 (8th
Cir. 1983). However, the term "fundamentalist" may attach an unfair and negative
connotation to those individuals who have chosen to live their lives in strict adher-
ence to their religious beliefs. It is for this reason that hereinafter, although adhering
to its usage by commentators, the term is used with great hesitancy.
316. Morris, supra note 313, at 205-09.
317. Id. at 205.
vine creation of man as taught in the Bible and to teach instead that man has
descended from a lower order of animals."'
Another fundamentalist victory came in 1927 when the Tennessee
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Tennessee Anti-Evo-
lution Act in the landmark case of Scopes v. State.319 The Scopes case,
also known as the "monkey trial," was a media circus which pitted three-
time presidential candidate and Bible-believer, William Jennings Bryan,
against the famous criminal attorney and agnostic lecturer, Clarence
Darrow.2° Despite the in-court drama which ensued between the two
attorneys," the defendant, Scopes, was found guilty of teaching evolu-
tion in the public schools and fined $100.2 On appeal to the Tennessee
Supreme Court, Scopes argued that the Anti-Evolution. Act violated the
education and religion clauses of the Tennessee Constitution and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.'
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the conviction on a technicali-
tym but upheld the Act on constitutional grounds.2 The court ruled
that the Act was a valid exercise of the state's authority to legislate and
control the public schools and the activities of state employees. 6 The
Tennessee Constitution provided "that no preference shall ever be given,
by law, to any religious establishment or mode of worship." "2 In re-
318. 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts 27. At least one commentator has argued that the gover-
nor of Tennessee only signed the legislation on "the explicit understanding that the
ban would not be enforced." JOHNSON, supra note 303, at 4-5.
319. 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927); see Neil Brooks, Note, Constitutional Law-Validity
of the Tennessee Anti-Evolution Law, 5 TENN. L. REV. 242 (1927) (providing addition-
al analysis of the Scopes decision). For a detailed account and history of the Scopes
trial, see EDWARD J. LARSON, TRIAL AND ERROR: THE AMERICAN CONTROVERSY OVER
CREATION AND EVOLUTION (rev. ed. 1989); KEVIN TIERNEY, DARROW: A BIOGRAPHY
(1979); L. SPRAGUE DE CAMP, THE GREAT MONKEY TRIAL (1968).
320. JOHNSON, supra note 303, at 4-5. Johnson suggests that Scopes was a test case
engineered by opponents of the law. Id. at 5. Johnson asserts that Scopes, a former
substitute teacher, was not even sure whether he had ever taught evolution, but
nonetheless volunteered to be the defendant. Id.
321. Id.
322. Scopes, 289 S.W. at 363.
323. Id. at 364-66. It is critical to note that Scopes could not appeal on the ground
that the Tennessee law violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution be-
cause the First Amendment had not yet been incorporated to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 2.
324. Scopes, 289 S.W. at 367. At the trial level, the jury found Scopes guilty, but the
judge imposed the fine of $100. Id. This violated the Tennessee Constitution which
mandated that juries assess all fines above $50. Id.
325. Id. at 364-67.
326. Id. at 365.
327. Id. at 366 (citing TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 3).
[Vol. 21: 477, 1994] Government's Denigration of Religion
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
sponse to the claim that the Act violated the religion clause of the state
constitution, the court stated that:
We are not able to see how the prohibition of teaching the theory that man has
descended from a lower order of animals gives preference to any religious estab-
lishment or mode of worship. So far as we know, there is no religious estab-
lishment or organized body that has in its creed or confession of faith any article
denying or affirming such a theory. So far as we know, the denial or affirmation
of such a theory does not enter into any recognized mode of worship.'
These early fundamentalist victories had a definite influence on the
public school curriculums throughout the early and mid 19 0 0 s.' This
influence was primarily seen in the area of textbook selection." "Gen-
erally, textbooks avoided the topic of evolution and did not mention the
name of Darwin." "n
The fundamentalists, however, were forced to go on the defensive in
the 1960s.n2 Two factors prompted this shift. First, the Secular Human-
ist movement gained momentum as a result of the many social changes
which occurred during the 1960s.' Secondly, in 1957, the United States
experienced a profound and renewed interest in science after the Soviet
328. Id. at 367.
329. Morris, supra note 313, at 205-06.
330. Id. at 206.
331. Id. Although many of the early anti-evolution statutes were not enforced, text-
book publishers avoided the topic of evolution to escape the controversy. JOHNSON,
supra note 303, at 6. For a statistical analysis of the coverage received by the theory
of evolution in biology textbooks, see GERALD SKOOG, The Topic of Evolution in
Secondary School Biology Textbooks: 1900-1977, in EVOLUTION VERSUS CREATIONISM:
THE PUBUC EDUCATION CONTROVERSY 65-89 (J. Peter Zetterberg ed., 1983).
332. Morris, supra note 313, at 206.
333. Throughout most of American history, the United States was generally viewed
as a predominantly religious nation. Hitchcock, supra note 50, at 3. Through the lat-
ter portion of the 1950s, religious belief and observance were honored. Id. In fact,
"[b]illboards urged citizens to 'Attend church this week,' as though church-attendance
were a self-evidently good thing." Id. However, the 1960s and 1970s saw a dramatic
decline in this nation's "religiosity." Id. at 4.
Some commentators have theorized that the Secular Humanist movement gained
momentum during that time period as a result of the many social changes which
occurred during the 1960s. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 57. "[R]eligion and traditional
morality were closely identified with what [became known as] 'the establishment.'" Id.
The anti-establishment movement, which characterized the social climate of the 1960s,
attacked traditional religion as being a lifestyle that was not appropriate or suitable
to the changed society. Id. Today, a "secularist stance enjoys a prestige equal to that
of religious belief." Hitchcock, supra note 50, at 4. For a more detailed discussion,
see supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
Union launched the Sputnik satellite.' At approximately that time, the
Biological Sciences Curriculum Study ("BSCS"), a non-profit organization
consisting of scientists and school teachers, was formed.' The BSCS
published a series of books which "incorporated evolution as a major
theme."' A 1977 study of secondary school biology textbooks revealed
that eighty-seven of the ninety-three textbooks surveyed defined or ex-
plained the theory of evolution."m By 1982, the BSCS curriculum had
been incorporated into almost every biology text.'
2. Epperson-The Fundamentalist's Downfall
In 1968, the Supreme Court dealt the fundamentalists a severe blow. In
Epperson v. Arkansas,' the Court ruled that an Arkansas anti-evolu-
tion statute, modeled after the Tennessee statute upheld in Scopes, vio-
lated the First Amendment."o The Arkansas statute prohibited any pub-
lic school teacher from teaching the theory of evolution."l The statute
stated in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any teacher or other instructor in any... Public
School... to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended
from a lower order of animals and also it shall be unlawful for any teacher... to
adopt or use in any such institution a textbook that teaches the theory that man-
kind descended or ascended from a lower order of animals.'
Violators of the law were subject to criminal misdemeanor charges and
dismissal from their employment in the state public school system.'
Epperson, a tenth-grade biology teacher, instituted an action in the
state Chancery Court seeking a declaration that the statute was void.'
334. Morris, supra note 313, at 206.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. SKOOG, supra note 331, at 67. Skoog argues, however, that the percentage of
total words devoted to the theory of evolution decreased between 19Q9 and 1977. Id.
at 69. Skoog attributes this decrease to a lack of acceptance among biologists, pres-
sures exerted by anti-evolutionists, creationists, and religious groups, apprehension
among publishers, threatened teachers, and numerous other forces. Id. at 83-84.
338. Morris, supra note 313, at 206.
339. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 98-
109. Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart authored separate concurring opinions. Id. at
109-16. See Lucien J. Dhooge, From Scopes to Edwards: The Sixty-Year Evolution of
Biblical Creationism in the Public School Classroom, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 187 (1988)
(providing a history of statutes aimed at eliminating the theory of evolution from the
public school classrooms).
340. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 109.
341. Id. at 98-99.
342. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1627 ,(1960).
343. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98-99.
344. Id. at 100.
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The Chancery Court ruled that the statute violated the First and Four-
teenth Amendments by interfering with the freedom of speech and
thought. 5 The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court's
decision on the basis that the law was "a valid exercise of the state's
power to specify the curriculum in its public schools.""6
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court's
decision and held that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 7 The Court did not invalidate the statute on the grounds
that it infringed upon the First Amendment right to freedom of speech,
as did the Arkansas Chancery Court.' Instead, the Court ruled that the
statute conflicted "with the constitutional prohibition of state laws re-
specting an establishment of religion.""'
The Court stated that government "must be neutral in matters of reli-
gious theory, doctrine, and practice. "3" The Court further stated that
government "may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of
non-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or reli-
gious theory against another or even against the militant opposite." "
The Court added that "[t]he First Amendment mandates government neu-
trality... between religion and non-religion." 2
In analyzing the legislative history of the statute, the Court reasoned
that the law was enacted solely to prevent the teaching of a theory that
conflicted with creationism.' The Court concluded that such a purpose
was an obvious violation of religious neutrality, contrary to the mandate
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.' 5
Justice Black, however, recognized that the Court's decision had
opened the proverbial Pandora's box. Justice Black realized that there
345. Id.
346. Id. at 101 & n.7.
347. Id. at 109; see also Dhooge, supra note 339, at 189-94 (providing additional
analysis of Scopes and Epperson).
348. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 100.
349. Id. at 103.
350. Id. at 103-04.
351. Id. at 104.
352. Id. (citations omitted).
353. Id. at 109. Supporters of the law published various advertisements during the
campaign to adopt the statute. Id. at 108 n.16. A typical advertisement read: "Shall
conscientious church members be forced to pay taxes to support teachers to teach
evolution which will undermine the faith of their children? The Gazette said Russian
Bolshevists laughed at Tennessee. True, and that sort will laugh at Arkansas." Id.
354. Id. at 109.
were considerable First Amendment implications associated with overrul-
ing an anti-evolution statute.m Justice Black noted that the Court's de-
cision may very well have infringed upon "the religious freedom of those
who consider evolution an anti-religious doctrine."3 Justice Black also
stated that the Arkansas statutory scheme was arguably neutral as to
religion and anti-religion because neither the Biblical origins of man nor
the anti-religious doctrine of evolution were allowed to be taught in the
Arkansas schools. 7 Justice Black's concerns, however, went largely un-
noticed.' Today, as a result of the work done by the BSCS, the vast
majority of public school biology textbooks present the theory of evolu-
tion.'m
B. Evolution-The Foundation of Secular Humanism
The theory of evolution is one of the major tenets of Secular Human-
ism." This tenet is clearly set forth in both Manifesto I and Manifesto
II.' Manifesto I states, in relevant part:
"Religious humanists regard the universe as self-existing and not created.
Humanism believes that man is part of nature and that he has emerged as a result
of a continuous process ....
Humanism recognizes that man's religious culture and civilization, as clearly de-
picted by anthropology.., and history, are the product of a gradual develop-
ment .... "'
Manifesto II states, in relevant part, "'Science affirms that the human
species is an emergence from natural evolutionary forces. ' "'
355. Id. at 113 (Black, J., concurring).
356. Id. (Black, J., concurring); see also Bird, supra note 305, at 570 (arguing that
exclusive instruction in the general theory of evolution violates the Free Exercise
Clause). But see Dhooge, supra note 339, at 194-96 (asserting that the Free Exercise
violations are too tenuous to invoke constitutional protections).
357. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 113 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black further stated
that the Court's ruling could only be reconciled if the "Court is prepared to simply
write off as-pure nonsense the views of those who consider evolution an anti-reli-
gious doctrine." Id. (Black., J., concurring).
358. For example, in response to the Court's decision in Epperson, the California
Attorney General drafted an opinion which stated that a treatment of evolution in
public school textbooks, without a complimentary discussion of creationism, does not
violate the neutrality requirement of the First Amendment. See 58 Op. Att'y Gen. 262
(1975).
359. See supra note 334-37 and accompanying text.
360. See Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 47. For a complete list of the ten-
ets of Secular Humanism, see id. at 37-54; KuRrz, supra note 62, at 4147.
361. See supra, notes 186-204 and accompanying text.
362. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 46 (quoting HUMANIST MANIFESTO I)
(emphasis omitted).
363. Id. (quoting HUMANIST MANIFESTO II).
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The principles set forth in Manifesto I and Manifesto II suggest that
the theory of evolution is the cornerstone of Secular Humanism.' Not
only is this a logical conclusion, but Secular Humanism would be "incom-
prehensible without the evolutionary hypothesis."' George Wald, a
Harvard biologist, stated, "'There are only two possibilities: either life
arose by spontaneous generation... or it arose by supernatural cre-
ation .... [T]here is no third position.' "3" Secular Humanism is
founded upon the belief that no deity or Creator exists.3" The theory of
evolution restates this "aversion to the concept of a theistic deity" be-
cause the "central thrust of evolution is the eradication of any chance of
supernatural intervention into the universe or the affairs of man."'
Therefore, at this juncture, having established that (1) the Establish-
ment Clause forbids the teaching of religious principles in the public
schools," (2) Secular Humanism is a religion,n and (3) evolution is a
tenet of the Secular Humanist faith,37' the critical issue is to determine
whether the teaching of evolution in the public schools violates the First
Amendment. However, the nature and importance of this issue becomes
manifest only after an analysis of the history and inherent meaning of the
First Amendment.
364. Id. at 29.
365. Id. at 54.
366. Id. at 52 (quoting George Wald, Theories of the Origin of Life, in FRONTIERS
OF MODERN BIOLOGY 187 (1962)). As noted earlier, there have been attempts to recon-
cile the two concepts by asserting that a deity utilized the evolutionary process as a
means of creating the universe. See supra note 308-12 and accompanying text. How-
ever, such a reconciliation is not plausible from a Secular Humanist perspective be-
cause Secular Humanism rejects the possibility of a deity.
367. Manifesto I clearly states that "'[rieligious humanists regard the universe as
self-existing and not created. Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe depict-
ed by modem science makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of
human value.'" HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 11 (quoting HUMANIST MANIFESTO I) (em-
phasis added); accord Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 52.
368. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 87, at 52.
369. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 181-221 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 356-68 and accompanying text.
VI. THE PROVERBIAL WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE-AN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Few nations founded in modem times have had as strong a religious
heritage as the United States.3" To properly understand the many possi-
ble interpretations of the Establishment Clause, it is necessary to briefly
review that part of American history which led to the adoption of the
First Amendment.
A. A Trip Through Early American History
Many of the early American settlers were Christians seeking freedom
to worship according to their own conscience.3' Many of these settlers
fled "from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them
to support and attend government favored churches."3"4 Pursuant to the
laws of these European nations, any citizen who refused to support the
state church was punished by fines, jail terms, torture, and even
death."7 5
372. HITCHCOCK, supra note 5, at 49.
373. Id. Among the early settlers were Puritans who settled in New England, Quak-
ers who settled in Pennsylvania, English Protestants who settled on the Atlantic Sea-
board, and French and Spanish Catholics who settled in the Mississippi Valley, Flori-
da, and the Southwest. Id.
374. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). In Everson, Justice Black set
forth a detailed historical analysis which prefaced his interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clause. See id. at 8-14. Justice Black noted that "Catholics had persecuted Prot-
estants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics, . . .and all of these .. .had persecut-
ed Jews." Id. at 9.
For an historical analysis of the conflicts and tensions among the faiths, see
Laycock, supra note 2, at 417-18.
375. Everson, 330 U.S. at 9. The offenses which warranted such punishments includ-
ed "speaking disrespectfully of the views of ministers of government-established
churches, nonattendance at those churches, expressions of non-belief in their doc-
trines, and failure to pay taxes and tithes to support them." Id.
This essential part of history played a great role in the Court's ruling that man-
datory prayer in the public schools violated the First Amendment. See Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 429-30 (1962). In Engel, the Board of Education in New Hyde Park,
New York mandated that the public school principal begin each day with a prayer
that read, "'Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg
Thy blessing upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our Country.'" Id. at 422. The
Court invalidated the board's mandate on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 436. Jus-
tice Black, again writing for the Court, noted that "[ilt is a matter of history that this
very practice of establishing governmentally composed prayers for religious services
was one of the reasons which caused many of our early colonists to leave England
and seek religious freedom in America." Id. at 425.
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To the dismay of those who sought religious freedom, the old world
practices and persecutions continued to thrive in the American colonies
in much the same way as in Europe."' The English Crown mandated
the creation of religious establishments and required that all colonists
support those establishments and attend their religious services." By
the time of the American Revolution, all of the American colonies had
some form of a quasi-official church.'7
Surprisingly, these practices did not change after the Revolutionary
War.' Though many men and women fought and died in efforts to end
these practices and persecutions, "some of the very groups which had
most strenuously opposed the established Church of England... passed
laws making their own religion the official religion of their respective
colony."' ° Many argue that it was the abhorrence of these practices
"which ultimately found expression in the First Amendment.""'
In 1785, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Virginia Bill for Religious Liber-
ty.' The Bill's preamble stated:
"Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by
temporal punishments, or burthens, or by civil incapacitations .. are a departure
from the plan of the Holy author of our religion who being Lord both of body and
mind, yet.., chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, that to compel a
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical ...
376. Everson, 330 U.S. at 9.
377. Id. (footnote omitted).
378. HrrcHcocK, supra note 5, at 49.
379. Everson, 330 U.S. at 10-11.
380. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 427 (1962); see, e.g., Developments in the
Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1614 & n.12 (citing A. REICHLEY,
RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 96 (1985) (stating that the Congregational Church
was established in Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, while the Angli-
can Church was established in Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North and
South Carolina, and Virginia)).
381. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11. For an overview of the early colonial practices and
the events leading up to the passage of the First Amendment, see generally THOMAS
J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).
382. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11 (footnote omitted). Justice Black believed that the
growing opposition to the political power possessed by such religious groups as the
Presbyterians, Lutherans, Quakers, and Baptists provided the driving force behind the
Bill. Engel, 370 U.S. at 428.
383. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12-13.
The actual statute stated, "'That no man shall be compelled to frequent
or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall
be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened, in his body or goods,
nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or be-
liefs."'"
B. The "Wall" and the Separationist Approach
The Supreme Court's decision in Everson v. Board of Education'
generated.a great deal of Establishment Clause doctrinal tension.' At
issue was the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that authorized
school districts to reimburse parents for expenses incurred in transport-
ing their children to school. 7 In addition to reimbursing parents of
public school children, the districts were authorized to reimburse parents
of children who attended Catholic parochial schools.' These schools
provided students with regular religious instruction in addition to a secu-
lar education. 9
In construing the First Amendment Establishment Clause, Justice
Black argued that the Virginia Bill and the resulting law had a tremen-
dous impact on the drafters of the First Amendment.' ° Justice Black
noted that the First Amendment was "intended to provide the same
protections against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Vir-
ginia Statute."39' On this basis, Justice Black set forth the principle of
Separation of Church and State in one of the most often quoted First
Amendment interpretations:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbe-
384. Id. at 13 (footnote omitted). For an overview of the events leading up to the
passage of the Virginia Bill and the resulting law, see generally Laycock, supra note
2, at 410-11.
385. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 3-18.
Justice Jackson authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Frankfurter joined. Id.
at 18-28. Justice Rutledge authored a separate dissenting opinion in which Justices
Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton joined. Id. at 28-74.
386. See Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1632-
34.
387. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 11-14. Justice Black stated that the First Amendment embodies the same
objectives and intentions as the Virginia law. Id. (citations omitted).
391. Id. at 13.
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liefs, for church attendance or non-attendance .... In the words of [Thomas]
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State."
From the date Justice Black enunciated the Separation of Church and
State Doctrine, the language of his opinion has become "the governing
metaphor in the area of church-state relations." 3 In light of his lengthy
analysis, however, Justice Black ruled that, although "[t]he First Amend-
ment has erected a wall between church and state... [and] that wall
392. Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Justice Blackmun has referred
to this quotation as "the often-repeated summary" of the essential precepts of the
Establishment Clause. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989).
393. Hitchcock, supra note 50, at 7. It is interesting to note that the separationist
doctrine rests on anti-religious grounds. Id. at 9. For example, Justice Black had a
particular dislike of the Catholic Church. Id. (citing HUGO BLACK, JR., My FATHER, A
REMEMBERANCE (1975); VIRGINIA VAN DER VEER HAMILTON, HUGO BLACK: THE ALABAMA
YEARS (1972)). Justice Black regarded church-goers as hypocrites and "regarded reli-
gious believers as uniquely likely to torture, maim, and kill in the name of their be-
liefs." Id.
It is also worthy to note that Justice Black was not the only member of our
Supreme Court to find the Catholic Church objectionable. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), Justice William 0. Douglas stated:
In the parochial schools Roman Catholic indoctrination is included in every
subject. History, literature, geography, civics, and science are given a Roman
Catholic slant. The whole education of the child is filled with propaganda,
that, of course, is the very purpose of such schools, the very reason for
going to all of the work and expense of maintaining a dual school system.
Their purpose is not so much to educate, but to indoctrinate and train, not
to teach Scripture truths and Americanism, but to make loyal Roman Catho-
lics.
Id. at 635 n.20 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing LORAINE BOETTNER, ROMAN CATHOLICISM
360 (1962)). In formulating his opinion of the parochial school system, Justice Douglas
cited a book written by a Protestant Fundamentalist. Hitchcock, supra note 50, at 9.
This book claimed "that Catholic priests and religious teachers are not allowed to
think, that parochial schools represent a dangerous 'foreign' influence in the United
States, and that they produce a disproportionate number of gangsters and juvenile
delinquents." Id. at 9-10 (citing LORAINE BOETTNER, ROMAN CATHOLICISM 360-63, 364, 368,
370, 379-80 (1962)).
The anti-Catholic dogma espoused by Justices Black and Douglas was certainly
inimical to previous Supreme Court decisions that asserted, "We are a Christian people,
and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon Christianity." Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine
that Justices Black and Douglas, whose opinions obviously rested upon their own anti-
Catholic polemic, were "neutral" in regards to their First Amendment philosophies.
must be kept high and impregnable," the statute did not violate the First
Amendment.'
In a dissenting opinion, 5 Justice Rutledge set forth the separationist
approach-a theory that "would require government and religion to occu-
py strictly autonomous spheres."' Justice Rutledge argued that the
wall separating Church and State must remain truly "high and impreg-
nable." 7 In support of this position, Justice Rutledge asserted:
The Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment
of a single sect, creed, or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as had
prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot all
such relationships .... It was to create a complete and permanent separation of
the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding
every form of public aid or support for religion.'
Accordingly, Justice Rutledge argued that the New Jersey law, by provid-
ing funds to assist children in attaining a daily religious education, violat-
ed the First Amendment.'
C. Dissent From the Chief Justices
From an historical perspective, Chief Justice Rehnquist has long op-
posed Justice Black's interpretation of the Establishment Clause.4" Jus-
394. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
395. Id. at 28-74 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
396. See Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1635
(asserting that separationism is unworkable in practice).
397. Everson, 330 U.S. at 29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
398. Id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
The strict separationist approach originated during the Enlightenment of the eigh-
teenth century. Hitchcock, supra note 50, at 7. During that period, most people were
"suffering from the aftermath of religious wars which had been common in the previ-
ous two centuries." Id. The common perception was that organized religious groups
were "the natural enemy of freedom." Id. at 7-8. The strict separationist approach
was viewed as a means to protect society from intense and often dangerous religious
quarrels. Id. at 8.
Justice Black articulated the separationist viewpoint by stating:
It was precisely because Eighteenth Century Americans were a religious peo-
ple divided into many fighting sects that we were given a constitutional man-
date to keep Church and State completely separate. Colonial history had
already shown that, here as elsewhere, zealous sectarians entrusted with
governmental power to further their causes would sometimes torture, maim,
and kill those they branded "heretics," "atheists," and agnostics."
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318-19 (1952).
399. Everson, 330 U.S. at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See Developments in the
Law--Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1631-39 (differentiating the various in-
terpretations of the First Amendment).
400. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-113 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that "moment of silence" laws may be constitutional under the First
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tice Black's reference to "the words of [Thomas] Jefferson" referred to a
personal letter written by Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association in
1802 that read, "'I contemplate with sovereign reverence that the act of
the whole American people which declared that their legislature should
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between church
and State.'""° Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the thoughts and im-
pressions of Jefferson cannot be, and should not have been, relied upon
in interpreting the meaning of the Establishment Clause.' First, Jeffer-
son was residing in France during the congressional debates which lead
to the passage of the First Amendment, and therefore, he did not partici-
pate in the drafting of the religion clauses.' Second, Justice Black re-
ferred to a letter written by Jefferson fourteen years after the First
Amendment was adopted.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the works of James Madison, rath-
er than the works of Jefferson, should provide the focal point of First
Amendment analysis. 5 Madison, who played a large role in drafting the
First Amendment, initially proposed the following language, which be-
came the basis of the First Amendment: "'The civil rights of none shall
be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any na-
tional religion be established. .. .""' Chief Justice Rehnquist asserts
that this language does not coincide with the "wall of separation" prin-
ciple which Justice Black has espoused."7 Chief Justice Rehnquist adds
that none of the members of Congress who spoke during the constitu-
tional debate indicated that the First Amendment would require govern-
ment to remain "absolutely neutral as between religion and irreligion."4"
Amendment). Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "It is impossible to build sound constitu-
tional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortu-
nately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's mislead-
ing metaphor for nearly 40 years." Id. at 92. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
401. Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see
also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (Chief Justice Burger confirming the
date of Jefferson's letter).
402. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
403. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
404. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See generally ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982)
(analyzing the historical fallacies of Justice Black's Everson decision).
405. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
406. Id. at 94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 Annals of Congress 434 (1789)).
407. Id. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
408. Id. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Rather, Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that "[tihe evil to be aimed at...
appears to be the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps the
preference of one religious sect over another; but [the First Congress]
was definitely not concerned about whether the Government might aid
all religions evenhandedly. " '
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger was in accord with the impres-
sions of his successor. In Lynch v. Donnelly,"' Chief Justice Burger
stated that the First Amendment never intended, nor does it require,
complete separation of church and state.' Chief Justice Burger argued
that the concept of the "wall of separation" is only a metaphor which
does not "accurately descri[be] the practical aspects of the relationship
that in fact exists between church and state."" Chief Justice Burger
emphasized that no segment of society, nor any institution, can exist in
total isolation from the government.4"3
Regardless of the historical interpretation one chooses to accept, the
Framers of our Constitution, and the amendments thereto, intended to
protect both believers and non-believers from the evils, fears, and politi-
409. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In support of his argument, Chief Justice
Rehnquist quoted Joseph Story, a Justice of the Supreme Court from 1811 to 1845,
who stated:
[Tihe universal sentiment of America was, that Christianity ought to receive
encouragement from the State so far as was not incompatible with the pri-
vate rights of conscience and the freedom of religious worship. An attempt
to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in
utter indifference, would have created universal disappropriation, if not uni-
versal indignation .... The real object of the [First] [Almendment was . . .
to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national
ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive
patronage of the national government.
Id. at 104-05 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTTrnUION OF THE
UNITED STATES 630-32 (5th ed. 1891) (alterations in original)); see also CORD, supra
note 404, at 8-12 (attacking the position taken by Justice Black). But see Laycock,
supra note 2, at 411-14 (arguing that the amendment actually adopted by the First
Congress spoke generically of "religion," not of "a religion" or "a national religion").
410. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
411. Id. at 673.
412. Id. Chief Justice Burger commented, "Our history is replete with official refer-
ences to the values and invocation of Divine guidance in deliberations and pro-
nouncements of the Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders." Id. at 675. As an
example, Chief Justice Burger noted that "[tihe day after the First Amendment was
proposed, Congress urged President Washington to proclaim a 'day of public
thanksgiving and prayer.'" Id. at 675 n.2. For numerous other examples of government
acknowledgement of religious activity, see generally id. at 674-78.
413. Id. at 673. For an overview of the debates which lead to the adoption of the
First Amendment, see generally Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitu-
tion: The Religious Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL.
L REV. 3 (1978).
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cal problems present in society at the time.4" The Framers clearly in-
tended the First Amendment to protect citizens from being forced to
abide by and profess a faith in majoritarian religious beliefs.4"5 For the
purposes of this Comment, however, the issue is whether the First
Amendment was also intended to protect those who do profess a belief
in the majoritarian views 46 from persecution by those who do not.
VII.. THE TEACHING OF EVOLUTION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
IS ARGUABLY A VIOLATION OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Questions regarding the propriety of religion in public school curricu-
lums have plagued our society since the origin of the public school sys-
tem. 4 7 Initially, schools incorporated Bible readings and prayers in their
exercises as a means of instructing values and ideals."' Proponents of
such teaching methods argued that Bible readings and prayers were a
means of avoiding an irreligious, or non-religious, morality in society.1 9
In the 1960s, however, the role of religion in the public schools began
to change dramatically." ° In 1962, the Supreme Court ruled that recita-
tion of prayers in the public schools violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.42" ' One year later, the Court also declared Bible
readings in public schools to be unconstitutional.4' Since that time, the
Court has consistently ruled that any state-sanctioned religious expres-
sion in the public schools violates the Establishment Clause.
414. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-18 (1947).
415. See generally Bergeron, supra noie 65.
416. A recent study suggests that approximately ninety-five percent of Americans be-
lieve in God. Religion in America: 50 Years: 1935-1985, THE GALLUP REPORT 50
(May 1985). This study suggested that this percentage has remained constant since
1945. Id. Therefore, the author's reference to "majoritarian beliefs" refers to those
religious faiths which are theistic in nature.
417. MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW, 146 (3rd ed. 1992).
418. Id. (citing LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL 66-70 (1951)).
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
422. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963).
423. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (declaring that a "moment
of silence" law violated the First Amendment because the fundamental purpose of the
law was to promote religion); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (striking down
a statute requiring the Ten Commandments to be posted in public school class-
A. The Supreme Court's Role-Keep Religion Out of the Public Schools
Before determining the central issue of this Comment-whether the
teaching of evolution, a tenet of the religion of Secular Humanism, vio-
lates the Establishment Clause-it is essential to set forth the Supreme
Court's rationale for prohibiting all forms of religious expression in the
public schools. In general, the Court's rationale was best stated as fol-
lows: "Families entrust public schools with the education of their chil-
dren, but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom
will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict
with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family."
424
Essentially, the Court's statement is an attempt to address several
concerns. First, the Court has recognized that a primary function of the
public school system is to promote tolerance and respect for the variety
of beliefs that exist in our culture.22 In this sense, subjecting a public
school student to instruction that is adverse to his or her religious beliefs
may burden that student's religious liberty." Therefore, the public
school's function requires that its curriculum remain free of any religious
training which may interfere with, or contradict, the religious beliefs of
students.427
Secondly, the Court has consistently recognized the particular vulnera-
bility of school-age children.4" Courts and commentators have acknowl-
edged that students at the secondary and elementary levels are especially
susceptible to a teacher's influence and to peer pressure from fellow
classmates.429 The Court's general fear is that "children's impressionabil-
rooms); see also Developments in the Law--Religion and the State, supra note 66, at
1659).
424. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (striking down the Louisiana
Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School In-
struction Act).
425. Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1660
(citing School Dist. of Abington Township, 374 U.S. at 242 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
426. Bird, supra note 305, at 524 (arguing that the exclusive teaching of evolution
is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause).
427. See Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1659-
60.
428. Id. at 1660 (arguing that minor children are especially vulnerable to "indoctri-
nation and coercion"); accord Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 690
(11th Cir. 1987).
429. Bird, supra note 305, at 527. Accord Developments in the Law-Religion and
the State, supra note 66, at 1660 (citing McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
227 (1947)); Paul A. Freund, The Legal Issue, in PAUL A. FREUND & ROBERT ULRICII,
RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 15 (1965) (commenting on the impressionability of
school children).
This particular susceptibility is extremely dangerous, especially in the area of
religious instruction, because students at the secondary and elementary levels are not
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ity might lead them to perceive the presence of religious expression in
school as signifying the school authorities' approval of such expression,
and consequently, to feel pressure from teachers and fellow students to
conform to majority practice."'
This coercive pressure may manifest itself in numerous ways. First, the
teacher's position of authority, superior education, and difference in age
may have the effect of exerting influence over, and perhaps altering, a
student's personal beliefs."' In addition, the teacher's "ability to count
discrepant responses 'wrong"' may have the effect of penalizing disagree-
ments with the classroom presentation.'m Further, school-age children
often have a "need for group acceptance and social approval." "3 A stu-
dent risks being classified as a deviant by classmates if he or she refuses
to adopt the majority view.' Such a classification may have a severe
and adverse emotional impact.'
Lastly, the Court has recognized that mandatory attendance require-
ments intensify the public school's coercive authority.' "Students are
required to attend classes and may be required to study particular sub-
jects."47 As a result, course material that contradicts the student's reli-
gious faith may undermine those beliefs.'
All of these rationales have been widely asserted to prevent the per-
ceived dangers of allowing "majoritarian orthodoxy" into the public
able to "weigh classroom instruction analytically and do not approach religious issues
abstractly." Bird, supra note 305, at 527 (citations omitted). At least one commentator
has asserted that the ability to conceptualize religious questions does not fully de-
velop until after adolescence. Id. at 527 n.57 (citations omitted).
430. Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1660
(relying on McCollum, 333 U.S. at 227).
431. Bird, supra note 305, at 532; see also Smith, 827 F.2d at 690 (noting that stu-
dents often emulate teachers as role models).
432. Bird, supra note 305, at 532.
433. Id. at 532-33.
434. Id. at 533-34; see also Walter v. West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 1169
(S.D. W. Va. 1985) (noting that a Jewish boy was harassed by Christian students be-
cause he refused to pray during a mandatory moment of silence).
435. Bird, supra note 305, at 533-34.
436. Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1660; see
also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (striking down the Louisiana Bal-
anced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution Science in Public School In-
struction Act).
437. Bird, supra note 305, at 528 (asserting that exclusively teaching evolution in
the public schools violates the Free Exercise Clause).
438. Id.
school forum.' It is these very rationales, however, that should also
preclude the teaching of non-majoritarian beliefs in the public
schools." The Court has ruled that government cannot delete the theo-
ry of evolution from the public school curriculum."' The Court has also
ruled that government cannot seek to balance the theory of evolution
with an equal discussion of creationism."2 However, the Court has not
ruled upon the propriety of teaching the theory of evolution as a proven
scientific fact."3 On the basis of the assertion that Secular Humanism is
a religion, this Comment hypothesizes that the teaching of evolution in
the public schools, as a matter of proven scientific fact rather than as
theory, constitutes an establishment of religion in violation of the First
Amendment. In light of the absence of clear judicial authority, the follow-
ing analysis relies upon inference from precedent and the very purpose
of the First Amendment.
439. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (declaring that a "moment
of silence" law violates the First Amendment because the fundamental purpose of the
law was to promote religion); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (striking down
a statute requiring the Ten Commandments to be posted in public school class-
rooms); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (de-
claring Bible reading in public schools unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
424 (1962) (declaring the recitation of a state-composed prayer in the public schools
unconstitutional).
440. Commentators have argued that teaching the tenets of Secular Humanism in
public schools promotes an anti-religion which violates the principles of the First
Amendment. See generally Toscano, supra note 67. Secular Humanism rejects all
notions of a deity, and therefore, these arguments may have merit. However, as not-
ed in Section IV, supra, this Comment takes the position that Secular Humanism is a
religion, rather than an anti-religion.
441. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968) (declaring that a law prohibit-
ing the teaching of evolution in the public schools was enacted solely to prevent the
teaching of a theory that conflicted with divine creationism). For a more detailed
analysis of Epperson, see supra notes 339-59 and accompanying text.
442. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987) (striking down the Louisiana
Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School In-
struction Act as promoting creationism in violation of the First Amendment).
443. In 1981, the issue of whether the theory of evolution can be taught as fact
rather than as theory was addressed in Segraves v. California Bd. of Educ., No.
278978 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 12, 1981). In Segraves, Kelly Segraves, co-founder of the
Creation Science Research Center, "argued that the State of California had violated
the religious freedom of his children by teaching evolution as fact." Peter Gwynne et
al., "Scopes I" in California, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 16, 1981, at 67. Segraves' son testified
that his public school teacher "insisted that he descended from an ape." Id. California
Superior Court Judge Irving H. Perluss ruled that school teachers must qualify their
discussions of evolution with a statement that evolution is only a scientific hypothesis
and not a proven fact. Id.
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B. The "Midnight Ghoul"-The Lemon Test
The Supreme Court has ruled that the Establishment Clause requires
government to "pursue a course of complete neutrality toward reli-
gion.""4 In 1971, the Court developed a three-prong test to delineate the
breadth of the Establishment Clause and to determine whether govern-
ment action infringes upon the neutrality requirement which the First
Amendment mandates.' In Lemon v. Kurtzman,"4 the Court stated
that government actions must (1) have a secular purpose, (2) have as
their primary effect neither the advancement nor the inhibition of reli-
gion, and (3) not create "excessive governmental entanglements with
religion.""7 Government action violates the Establishment Clause if it
fails to satisfy any one of these three prongs.'
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that the content of the pub-
lic school curriculum have a secular, or non-religious, purpose."4 "'The
purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual pur-
pose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. ' '4" Unless the government
either overtly promotes the religion of Secular Humanism or pursues a
blatantly anti-religious agenda, the teaching of evolution in the public
schools, even if taught as fact rather than scientific hypothesis, would
probably not breach this first prong requirement.4" Introduction of the
evolutionary theory into the public school curriculum can be justified on
444. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985).
445. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
446. Id.
447. Id. (citations omitted); see, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485 (1986) (striking a state law that prohibited vocational rehabil-
itative assistance to students of private Christian colleges); School Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382-83 (1985) (striking a state "Shared Time" statute
that provided classes to nonpublic school students at public expense); Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708 (1985) (ruling that a state law granting
Sabbath observers an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath violated the
Establishment Clause); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444
U.S. 646, 653 (1980) (upholding a state law appropriating public funds to reimburse
both church-sponsored and secular nonpublic schools for performing services mandat-
ed by the State). This three-prong test is hereinafter referred to as "the Lemon test."
448. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987).
449. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; Freed, supra note 163, at 1174.
450. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)) (emphasis added); see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
40 (1980) (invalidating a law requiring the Ten Commandments to be posted in public
school classrooms).
451. See Freed, supra note 163, at 1174 & n.202.
the basis of furthering scientific awareness and knowledge, a completely
secular purpose, rather than as promoting Secular Humanism.452
The second prong of the Lemon test requires that the "subject matter
taught in public schools not have the primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion."" If the public school system "espouses religious be-
liefs, it advances religion; if it espouses anti-religious beliefs, it inhibits
religion."" In determining whether the primary effect of. the public
school curriculum is to espouse religious or anti-religious beliefs, the
court must determine "'whether the Government intends to convey a
message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.
'
'
4
5
When focusing on the public school system as a whole, once again,
unless the government either blatantly engages in a policy of promoting
Secular Humanism or pursues an obvious anti-religious agenda, the
teaching of evolution in the public schools, even as proven fact, would
probably not violate the second prong of the Lemon test." The
teaching of evolution may further a tenet of Secular Humanism and may
arguably be tantamount to espousing a belief in conflict with those reli-
gions founded upon creationism. However, it would be quite easy to
argue that the primary purpose of introducing the evolutionary theory is
to further scientific literacy, not to advance Secular Humanism or inhibit
other religions.45 Further, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled
that subject matter "taught in public schools does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause simply because the material [presented] 'happens to
coincide[] or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.' 41
When focusing on the individual public school teacher, however, it is
arguable that a contrary conclusion could be reached in certain circum-
stances. An individual teacher may violate the second prong if it is evi-
dent that he is utilizing the public school forum as a means of furthering
his own private religious agenda. For example, despite the policies and
mandates of a local school board, a public school teacher would clearly
452. Id. at 1174.
453. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243
(1968)); Freed, supra note 163, at 1174.
454. Freed, supra note 163, at 1174 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
455. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 n.52 (1985) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691
(O'Connor, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
456. See Freed, supra note 163, at 1182.
457. Id. As Justice Powell stated, "A religious purpose alone is not enough to invali-
date an act of a state legislature. The religious purpose must predominate." Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 599 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
458. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 422 (1961)); see also Edwards, 482 U.S. at 605 (Powell, J., concurring).
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violate the Establishment Clause if he took it upon himself to espouse
the principles set forth in the Bible.4
Similarly, a public school teacher would violate the First Amendment if
he used the public school forum as his own private pulpit to espouse the
doctrines of Secular Humanism as set forth in Manifesto I and Manifesto
II.41 Likewise, a public school teacher who affirmatively states that the
theory of evolution is the only true explanation of "where we come
from" might give rise to some very serious First Amendment concerns. In
this regard, the Supreme Court has stated that the Constitution forbids
hostility toward religion."' On that basis, it would appear that such an
affirmation would violate the Establishment Clause, especially if made in
response to an inquiry concerning countervailing theories of life's origins.
Although such statements would not necessarily affirm the religion of
Secular Humanism, they might be hostile to those religions founded on
tenets which are in conflict with evolution. Such an affirmation could
easily be construed as being tantamount to telling a student that his
religion is "wrong." '
459. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (de-
claring Bible reading in public schools unconstitutional).
460. For example, an unnamed Secular Humanist was quoted as stating:
I am convinced that the battle for human kind's future must be waged and
won in the public school classroom by teachers who correctly perceive their
role as the proselytizers of a new faith, a religion of humanity .... These
teachers must be ministers of another sort, utilizing a classroom instead of a
pulpit to convey humanist values in whatever subject they teach regardless of
the grade level ....
Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 969 (S.D. Ala.) (emphasis added)
(examining expert testimony as to the meaning of Secular Humanism), rev'd, 827 F.2d
684 (11th Cir. 1987). This excerpt, which calls for the wholesale indoctrination of pub-
lic school children, evidences a totalitarian philosophy which would undoubtedly have
as its primary effect the advancement of the religion of Secular Humanism.
461. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
462. See Freed, supra note 163, at 1182-83 (asserting that much of the controversy
surrounding First Amendment debate could be avoided if public "schools err on the
side of uncertainty and teach that the theory of evolution is indeed a theory and not
a fact").
See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). In Epperson, the Supreme
Court ruled that a statute prohibiting public school teachers from teaching the theory
of evolution violated the First Amendment. Id. at 109. The Court stated that the law
was enacted solely to prevent the teaching of a theory which conflicted with
creationism. Id. The Court concluded that such a purpose was an obvious violation
of the religious neutrality mandated by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
However, Justice Black recognized that there were considerable First Amendment
The connection between the theory of evolution and hostility toward
religion may, however, be too tenuous to give rise to First Amendment
protections. For instance, in Wright v. Houston Independent School Dis-
trict,4" a group of students sought to enjoin the public schools from
teaching the theory of evolution without critical analysis and without
reference to other theories of life's origins.' The students claimed that
such teaching practices violated the First Amendment.' The District
Court denied the students' claim and ruled that the offensive material
was only peripheral to the matter of religion.'
The third prong of the Lemon test prohibits government from engaging
in excessive entanglements with religion.4"7 Unless there is evidence of
contact between the public school authorities and Secular Humanist or-
ganizations in regard to the subject matter of the school curriculum, the
teaching of evolution in the public schools, even if taught as proven fact
rather than scientific hypothesis, would probably not breach the third
prong requirement.' Therefore, unless there is evidence that the public
schools are pursuing the illegitimate purpose of furthering the religion of
Secular Humanism, the teaching of evolution in the public schools would
probably not violate the Lemon test, and therefore would not violate the
First Amendment."
C. The Endorsement Test-The Impending Doom of Lemon
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled Lemon,"'
the rigid three-part test has been the subject of intense criticism.47' At
least one commentator has noted that "the three-part test has been so
implications in overruling an anti-evolution statute. Id. at 113 (Black, J., concurring).
Justice Black noted that the Court's decision may have infringed upon "the religious
freedom of those who consider evolution an anti-religious doctrine." Id. (Black, J.,
concurring).
463. 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), affd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1974). For an
additional analysis of Wright, see Sherri Schaeffer, Note, Edwards v. Aguillard: Cre-
ation Science and Evolution-The Fall of Balanced Treatment Acts in the Public
Schools, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 829, 835 (1988).
464. Wright, 366 F. Supp. at 1208.
465. Id. at 1209.
466. Id. at 1211.
467. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
468. See id. at 613-14.
469. See Freed, supra note 163, at 1174 n.202.
470. See Laycock, supra note 2, at 449 (discussing the three-part Lemon test).
471. Id. at 449 & n.252 (citing Johnson, supra note 3; Kurland, supra note 413); see
also Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1647-50
(noting that the Lemon test does not take into account the divergence of perspec-
fives between the accommodated and unaccommodated religious groups).
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elastic in its application that it means everything and nothing."4 72 In this
respect, application of the Lemon test often leads to irreconcilable deci-
sions.4"
Critiques of the Lemon test have not been limited to scholarly com-
mentary. Chief Justice Rehnquist has long suggested that the Court com-
pletely abandon the rigid test.474 Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the
Lemon test is difficult, if not impossible to apply because the Court has
never delineated exactly how the test is to operate. 475 The Chief Justice
attributes many of the problems inherent in the Lemon test to a lack of
historical foundation.47 As a result of the scholarly and judicial criti-
cism, the Supreme Court's recent First Amendment decisions evidence a
shift away from the Lemon test.477
472. Laycock, supra note 2, at 450 (asserting that the second and third prongs of
the Lemon test are Free Exercise concepts that have little to do with the Establish-
ment Clause).
473. Id. Compare Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (declaring prayer in public
schools unconstitutional) with Marsh v. Chambers 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding
prayer in state legislature session openings). Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668 (1984) (ruling that a city supported Nativity scene had a secular purpose and did
not create excessive entanglements) with Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S.
736 (1976) (approving government grants to church-sponsored colleges and universi-
ties).
474. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107-14 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
475. Id. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Accord Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688-89
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It has never been entirely clear .. .how the three parts
of the test relate to the principles enshrined in the Establishment Clause.").
476. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist has
not been alone among the members of the Supreme Court in his criticism of the
Lemon test. See id. at 90-91 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing for a complete reconsid-
eration of the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine). Most notable for his criticism
of Lemon is Justice Antonin Scalia. In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District, Justice Scalia stated:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon
stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence ....
The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so easy to
kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so,
but we can command it to return to the tomb at will. When we wish to
strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a
practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely.
113 S. Ct. 2141, 2150 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
477. In several cases involving Establishment Clause issues, the Supreme Court
refused to even apply the Lemon test. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655
(1992) (finding that the Lemon test was unnecessary in holding that a civic prayer at
In Lynch v. Donnelly,478 Justice O'Connor argued for a reformation of
Establishment Clause doctrine.4" At issue was the constitutionality of a
Nativity scene, or creche, erected by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island,
as part of an annual Christmas display.4" The display included many
secular items in addition to the creche.48' Certain city residents and the
American Civil Liberties Union argued that the creche promoted Chris-
tianity, and, therefore, violated the Establishment Clause.' The district
court agreed and permanently enjoined the city from including the
creche in its holiday display.' In a plurality decision, however, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the Christmas display did not run afoul of the
Lemon test, and therefore, did not violate the Establishment Clause.'
Justice O'Connor authored a separate concurring opinion in which she
called for a rethinking of the Lemon test.' Justice O'Connor argued for
the adoption of a new approach-an approach which latter became
known as the "endorsement" test.4 Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]he
Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political com-
munity.""7 In this sense, government action violates the Establishment
Clause if it endorses or disapproves of religion. "Endorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community. " ' Like-
wise, government "[d]isapproval sends the opposite message. " '
a public school graduation ceremony violates the Establishment Clause); Marsh v.
Chambers 463 U.S. 783, 786-95 (1983) (failing to comment on the circuit court's use
of the Lemon test with respect to prayer in the state legislature); Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982) (clarifying that the Lemon test is "intended to apply [only]
to laws affording a uniform benefit to a// religions"). But see Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.
Ct. at 2148 (utilizing the Lemon test in determining whether a school district violated
the Establishment Clause by refusing a church the use of school facilities for a reli-
gious-oriented film series).
478. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
479. Id. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
480. Id. at 671.
481. Id. The display "included, among other things, a Santa Claus house, reindeer
pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures
representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of
colored lights, [and] a large banner that reads 'SEASONS GREETINGS.'" Id.
482. Id. at 671-72.
483. Id. at 672.
484. Id. at 678-87.
485. Id. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
486. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (elabo-
rating on the standards set forth in Lynch).
487. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
488. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
489. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Govern-
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In addressing the issue of whether government action endorses or
disapproves of religion, courts must undergo essentially a two-part analy-
sis. First, every government action must be assessed by focusing on the
particular facts and circumstances.4 1 Second, courts must examine both
the message which the government intends to convey and the message
which the government actually conveys. 91 The government's message,
therefore, must be scrutinized both subjectively and objectively.' In
this sense, even government actions which unintentionally make religion
relevant to an individual's standing in the community may endorse or
disapprove of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
In Lynch, Justice O'Connor applied the endorsement test to the facts
and asserted that the holiday display did not violate the Establishment
Clause.4' First, in addressing the physical setting, Justice O'Connor not-
ed that the cr&he was only a small part of a large Christmas display
which featured numerous secular ornaments.495 Second, when focusing
on the display as a whole and in the context of the holiday season, Jus-
tice O'Connor stated that the display could not reasonably be understood
as either an endorsement of the Christian religion or a disapproval of
non-Christian faiths.4
ment Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped
Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986) (providing addi-
tional analysis of the Lynch decision); Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the
Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 503
(1992) (observing that Justice O'Connor's endorsement test will probably replace the
Lemon test in light .of recent Supreme Court decisions).
490. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
491. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
492. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
493. Id. at 692; see Developments in the Law--Religion and the State, supra note
66, at 1648-49 ("When government makes religion a part of civic life, the absence of
an official intention to influence or coerce religious belief does not negate the mes-
sage that adherence or participation is a precondition to full membership in the com-
munity.").
494. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
495. Id. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
496. Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice O'Connor reasserted the endorsement test. 472 U.S.
38, 67-84 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). At issue was the constitutionality of an
Alabama "moment of silence" law which mandated that public schools observe a
daily period of silence for meditation. Id. at 40. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor noted that the statute unconstitutionally endorsed religion because the law
possibly favored the child who engages in prayer over the child who does not. Id. at
73 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor further stated that "the message of
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU,497 the Supreme Court adopted the
endorsement test." At issue, once again, was the constitutionality of
two Christmas holiday displays.4" The first display included a cr&he
placed on the steps of the county courthouse.' With the exception of
several poinsettia plants and evergreen trees, the creche stood alone,
unaccompanied by any other secular ornaments.wl The second display
included a Jewish menorah.' Unlike the creche, the menorah was ac-
companied by other secular holiday ornaments, including a large deco-
rated Christmas tree and a banner that read "Salute to Liberty. " ' 3 Sever-
al local residents and the American Civil Liberties Union sued the county
and the city claiming that both displays violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.' In a plurality decision, the Supreme
Court ruled that only the creche display violated the Establishment
Clause.'
In its decision, the Court applied the two-part endorsement test.'W In
addressing the physical setting of the creche display, the Court noted
that the creche stood alone, unaccompanied by any secular symbols, and
therefore, nothing detracted from its religious message.' ° On that basis,
the Court concluded that it was reasonable for viewers to believe that
the government was sending a message of support and approval of a
particular religion.' The creche conveyed "a message to nonadherents
of Christianity that they are not full members of the political community,
endorsement would seem inescapable if the teacher exhorts children to use the desig-
nated time to pray." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Commentators have given the endorsement test mixed reviews. See Loewy, supra
note 489 (commenting that government neutrality toward religion can be best
achieved by application of the endorsement test). But see County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668-69 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the endorse-
ment test is flawed and unworkable, but recognizing that it is becoming the majority
approach in assessing Establishment Clause violations); Steven D. Smith, Symbols,
Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorse-
ment" Test, 86 MICH. L REV. 266 (1987) (criticizing the endorsement test).
497. 492 U.S. 573 (1989); see Barbara S. Barrett, Note, Religious Displays and the
First Amendment: County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 13 HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 399
(1990) (providing additional analysis of the County of Allegheny decision).
498. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S at 599-600, 612-15.
499. Id. at 578.
500. Id. at 580-81.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 582.
503. Id. at 581-82.
504. Id. at 587-88.
505. Id. at 621.
506. Id. at 598-613.
507. Id. at 598.
508. Id. at 599-600.
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and a corresponding message to Christians that they are favored mem-
bers of the political community."w
In addressing the Chanukah menorah, the Court noted that the meno-
rah was only a small part of an overall display which was predominated
by secular symbols."' On that basis, the Court ruled that the presence
of the menorah neither endorsed nor disapproved of religion, but simply
created an overall holiday setting."'
When analyzing the public school curriculum under the endorsement
test, it is arguable that the government violates the Establishment Clause
by teaching evolution as a proven scientific fact, rather than as a hypoth-
esis, because such teaching makes adherence to a religion relevant to the
public school students' standing in the community. At least one commen-
tator has noted that when the public schools adopt a curriculum that is
in accord with "the beliefs or practices of certain creeds[, it] is likely to
cause nonadherents of the accommodated faiths to feel that full mem-
bership in the community is contingent on acceptance of such
creeds.""' Therefore, the teaching of evolution as fact may send a mes-
sage to adherents of religions which denounce evolution "that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community.""' Likewise, the
teaching of evolution as fact may send an accompanying message to ad-
herents of religions that accept the theory of evolution, such as Secular
Humanism, "that they are insiders, favored members of the political com-
munity. "51
4
The first part of the endorsement test requires an examination of the
particular physical setting in which the government's message is
heard.5 As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has consistently recog-
nized that the public school forum is an especially sensitive area in re-
gard to Establishment Clause issues. 6' As such, the Court has been es-
pecially vigorous in prohibiting the presence of religion in the public schools.517
509. Id. at 626 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
510. Id. at 613-18.
511. Id. at 614-21.
512. Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, supra note 66, at 1649-50.
513. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
514. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
515. Id. at 692-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
516. See supra notes 424-38 and accompanying text; see also Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) (referring to the public school forum as a "special context").
517. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (declaring that a "moment of
silence" law violated the First Amendment because the fundamental purpose of the
law was to promote religion); see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (strik-
In light of the sensitive nature of the public school forum, the second
part of the endorsement test requires an objective examination of the
message which the government intends to convey, and a subjective ex-
amination of the message which the government actually conveys.5 ' As
noted earlier, by introducing the evolutionary theory into the public
school curriculum, it is quite easy to argue that the government intends
to promote scientific awareness rather than endorse or disapprove of
religion. In teaching the theory of evolution as fact, however, the govern-
ment may be unintentionally conveying a much different message.
Proponents of the evolutionary theory have stated, "'It is absolutely
safe to say that, if you meet somebody who claims not to believe in evo-
lution, that person is ignorant, stupid, or insane.""' Another commenta-
tor has opined that "every right thinking person knows that we have
evolved from lower species, and... notions of special creation proceed
from ancient myths, to be believed only at the peril of being out of touch
with reality."' ° Although such characterizations may appear to be ex-
treme positions, some argue that it is this very mentality which has crept
into the public school system."' In fact, it is difficult to imagine that a
public school student, who is inundated with the evolutionary theory,
without exposure to countervailing viewpoints, would believe that con-
trary theories of life's origins are even remotely possible.
Parents who have raised their children to believe' in creationism have
noted that their children are often ridiculed by their public school class-
mates for refusing to accept the evolutionary theory as fact.' In this
sense, government clearly makes adherence to religion relevant to the
students' standing in the community. On this basis, it is plausible to ar-
gue that government, in allowing the theory of evolution to be taught as
proven scientific fact rather than as theory, is endorsing Secular Human-
ism and disapproving those religions founded upon creationism, thereby
violating the First Amendment.
ing down a statute requiring the Ten Commandments to be posted in public school
classrooms); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963)
(declaring Bible reading in public schools unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 424 (1962) (declaring the recitation of a state-composed prayer in the public
schools unconstitutional).
518. See supra notes 490-93 and accompanying text.
519. JOHNSON, supra note 303, at 9.
520. SMITH, supra note 50, at 97.
521. See Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 94546 (S.D. Ala.)
(cross-complainants arguing that the teachings of Secular Humanism should be re-
moved from the purview of the public school curriculum), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th
Cir. 1987).
522. Id. at 945 (parent testifying that he feels compelled to re-educate his child in
regards to the theory of creationism on a daily basis).
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In sum, it is essential to return to the Supreme Court's rationale for
prohibiting all forms of religious expression in the public schools. The
Court has firmly stated that "[flamilies entrust public schools with the
education of their children, but condition their trust on the understand-
ing that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious
views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or
her family."' To fully appreciate the intrinsic importance of this state-
ment as it relates to the purpose of this Comment, it is necessary to
focus upon the context in which the Court made this statement.
In Edwards v. Aguillard,624 the Supreme Court addressed whether
Louisiana's Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Sci-
ence in Public School Instruction Act violated the First Amendment.5'
The Act prohibited the teaching of evolution unless accompanied by
instruction in creation science. 6 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
used the above-stated language to rule that the Act violated the Estab-
lishment Clause because its primary purpose was "to advance the reli-
gious viewpoint that a supernatural being created humanldnd.""7
Those who rely on Justice Brennan's statement as a means of prohibit-
ing the teaching of creationism and other theories which are antithetical
to evolution cannot "have their cake and eat it too." Justice Brennan was
quite correct in stating that parents entrust public schools with the edu-
cation of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding
that the classroom will not be used to advance religious views such as
creationism.' In the same vein, however, many parents also condition
their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not be used to
promote non-theistic religions, such as Secular Humanism, nor to den-
igrate the theistic beliefs they are trying to instill in their children. Just
as creationism may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and
his family, so too may evolution and other tenets of Secular Humanism
conflict with the private beliefs of many students and their families.
Therefore, the same rationales used to prohibit the teaching of
creationism in the public school classrooms can, and should, be used to
prevent the teaching of evolution as an established fact, rather than as a
scientific hypothesis.
523. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987).
524. Id.
525. Id. at 580-81.
526. Id. at 581.
527. Id. at 591.
528. See id. at 584.
VIII. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM
In the years following Engel v. Vitale52 and School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, numerous commentators have ar-
gued that the public schools have become hostile to religion."l Many of
these assertions stem from studies which have concluded that religion
has been completely removed from textbooks and school curricu-
lums. 2
A. Previous Proposals That Have Failed
In response to these complaints, numerous solutions have been pro-
posed. However, either Congress or the courts have rejected all of these
proposed solutions. For example, a number of jurisdictions enacted so-
called "moment of silence" laws which mandated a period of silence at
the beginning of every school day. 3 Many of these laws were either ex-
pressly or implicitly designed to provide a substitute for religious activ-
ities.' In Wallace v. Jaffree,r the Supreme Court ruled that a daily
period of silence, used for either meditation or voluntary prayer, was
tantamount to an endorsement of religion in violation of the First
Amendment.'
Efforts by former President Ronald Reagan, who was openly skeptical
of the evolutionary theory, proved equally futile. 7 In 1980, Reagan cam-
paigned on a platform that included allowing -the biblical theory of cre-
ation to be taught in public schools.' Once in office, Reagan proposed
a constitutional amendment that would have allowed prayer in the public
schools.n9 Reagan suggested that the amendment state, "'Nothing in this
Constitution shall be construed to prohibit individual or group prayer in
public schools or other public institutions. No person shall be required
529. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (declaring recitation of prayer in public schools unconstitu-
tional).
530. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (declaring Bible reading in public schools unconstitutional).
531. YUDOF, supra note 417, at 147-48 (citing generally George W. Dent Jr., Reli-
gious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 864 (1988)).
532. Id. at 148 (citing PAUL C. Vrrz, CENSORSmP: EVIDENCE OF BIAS IN OUR
CHILDREN'S TEXTBOOKS (1986)).
533. Id.
534. Id.
535. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
536. Id. at 60-61.
537. Malcom Jay Kottler, Evolution: Fact? Theory? . . .or Just a Theory?, in Evo-
LUTION VERSUS CREATIONISM: THE PUBLIC EDUCATION CONTROVERSY 29 (J. Peter
Zetterberg ed., 1983).
538. Id.
539. YUDOF, supra note 417, at 148.
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by the United States or by any State to participate in prayer." ' Con-
gress, however, never approved the proposed amendment."
B. A Proposition From the Author-Fact vs. Scientific
Hypothesis-Qualified Teaching Practices
As noted earlier, debates concerning the propriety of religion, as well
as the teaching of evolution, in public schools have raged from the day
the public school system was created. 2 Given that the theory of evolu-
tion may conflict with many religious views, the divergence of religious
beliefs in this country, and the fervor with which those beliefs are held,
there may never be a solution to this debate that will be amenable to all
sides. The purpose of this Section, however, is to propose a possible so-
lution to this seemingly irreconcilable conflict. 3
A great deal of the controversy surrounding the theory of evolution, as
an integral part of the public school curriculum, centers on the reality
that evolution is often taught as fact, and not as a scientific hypothe-
sis.' Such a method of teaching has a significant impact on most, if
not all, secondary public school students. 5 Most public school students
are required to enroll in at least one biology course. 6 The vast majority
of these biology courses exclusively teach the theory of evolution. 7
For example, the BSCS publishes one of the most widely used high
school biology textbooks.' This text notes that the entire biology
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id. at 146.
543. At least one commentator has postulated a solution that is worthy of note. In
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court allowed Amish parents to remove their chil-
dren from the public school system on the basis that the secular education conflicted
with their religious beliefs. 406 U.S. 205, 211-12, 235-36 (1972). Based on Yoder, Eric
Freed has argued that those who find the public school curriculum offensive to their
own religious beliefs should simply withdraw their children from the public school
system. Freed, supra note 163, at 1180. However, Freed's "like-it-or-leave-it" solution
is completely repugnant to the very principles which underlie the First Amendment.
544. See JOHNSON, supra note 303, at 3-14; see, e.g., supra text accompanying note
1. But see Bird, supra note 305, at 537 (arguing that the exclusive teaching of evolu-
tion violates the Free Exercise Clause regardless of whether it is labeled as "fact,"
"theory," or "one theory").
545. Bird, supra note 305, at 536.
546. Id.
547. Id.
548. Id. at 521 n.25 (citing BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES CURRICULUM STUDY, BIOLOGICAL SCI-
ENCE: AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH (3d ed. 1973)); see supra notes 334-37 and accompa-
course "'can be regarded as a summary of the evidence for evolu-
tion."
Many proponents of evolution, including noted scientist Theodosius
Dobzhansky, have referred to evolution, not as a theory, but as "the fact
of evolution."'s Dobzhansky has stated that the great weight of evi-
dence in favor of the evolutionary theory establishes that evolution is a
fact, much in the same way as evidence supports the conclusion that the
earth revolves around the sun. 5' Dobzhansky concludes that
"[e]volution, as a process that has always gone on in the history of the
earth, can be doubted only by those who are ignorant of the evidence or
are resistant to evidence, owing to emotional blocks or to plain bigot-
ry.
5 2
Although there are many scientists who view countervailing theories of
life's origins as tantamount to believing "that it is the stork that brings
babies," many dissidents deny that evolution is a fact.' Some scientists
recognize "the evolutionary theory as a conglomerate idea consisting of
conflicting hypotheses."m Eminent paleontologist and Harvard Profes-
sor Stephen Jay Gould published a scientific journal in which he stated
that "the weight of the evidence had driven him to the reluctant conclu-
sion that the [Darwinian] synthesis, 'as a general proposition, is effective-
ly dead, despite its persistence as textbook orthodoxy.'" 5 Even
Dobzhansky admits that there are "a multitude of problems yet unre-
solved and... questions unanswered. " ' Dobzhansky is quick to note
that anti-evolutionists mistake disagreements among scholars as indicat-
ing the "dubiousness of the entire doctrine of evolution." 7 However, a
theory rife with a multitude of unresolved problems and unanswered
questions can hardly be termed "factual." Although a detailed analysis of
the evidence in favor of, and in opposition to, the theory of evolution is
beyond the scope of this Comment, it is reasonable to conclude that
nying text (discussing the incorporation of evolution into biology textbooks).
549. Bird, supra note 305, at 537 n. 104 (quoting E. KLINCKMAN, BIOLOGY TEACHERS'
HANDBOOK 68 (2d ed. 1970)).
550. See id.
551. See Theodosius Dobzhansky, Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the
Light of Evolution, in EVOLUTION VERSUS CREATIONISM: THE PUBIC SCHOOL CONTRO-
VERSY 18-19 (J. Peter Zetterberg ed., 1983).
552. Id. at 27.
553. JOHNSON, supra note 303, at 3-6.
554. Id. at 11.
555. Id. (Johnson provides no citation for this scientific journal). Gould also stated,
"Darwin's notion of predictable progressive evolution is so much claptrap." See SMITH,
supra note 50, at 98.
556. See Dobzhansky, supra note 551, at 27.
557. Id.
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there is a legitimate controversy regarding the underlying principals of
evolution.'
On the basis of this conflict, it would perhaps be best if public school
teachers, without providing instruction as to religious philosophies, were
to instruct their students that the theory of evolution is just that-a theo-
ry. ' When certain doctrines are taught as fact, and no other plausible
alternative views are presented, the implication is that "whatever those
doctrines exclude cannot be true." ' Therefore, when evolution is
taught as fact, rather than as a scientific hypothesis, the public school
system sends a clear message to students that their world view may be
erroneous." This is especially pertinent to those students whose reli-
gious beliefs mandate a strict adherence to the theory of creationism.
As noted earlier, "the Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring
compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary
schools" because students in these institutions are especially impres-
sionable and subject to coercion from their teachers and other stu-
dents.' On this basis, it is quite possible that teaching evolution as fact
is tantamount to impressing upon a child that his religion is wrong.
The distinction between fact and theory must not simply be a matter
of semantics. Throughout elementary and secondary grade levels, the
public school system inundates students with the evolutionary theory. If
students are not also provided with critical analysis and sufficient cave-
ats, the mere labeling of evolution as a "theory" will do little or nothing
in the way of convincing students that other alternative theories of hu-
man origins exist and are adhered to. For this very reason, the public
school system should undertake several steps to insure that students are
not left with the impression that evolution is a matter of fact, and cor-
respondingly, that their view of the world is wrong.
First, the school curriculum should provide students with an ongoing
critical analysis of evolution. Lectures on the evolutionary theory should
558. For a more detailed analysis of this debate, see generally JOHNSON, supra note
303.
559. See Freed, supra note 163, at 1182 (asserting that much of the controversy
surrounding the debate could be averted if public "schools err on the side of uncer-
tainty and teach that the theory of evolution is indeed a theory and not a fact").
560. JOHNSON, supra note 303, at 7.
561. See Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a
Hobby, 1987 DuKE L.J. 977, 981 (1987) (addressing the creation-science controversy).
562. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987); see supra notes 422-35 and
accompanying text.
be accompanied by in-depth discussions of the numerous problems that
modem science has yet to adequately resolve. Second, at the outset,
students should be fully aware that the theory of evolution might conflict
with their personal religious beliefs. Lastly, and in connection with the
second step, teachers should inform students that evolution is not the
only theory of human origins. Students must be able to recognize that
not every segment of society is in complete agreement with certain mem-
bers of the scientific community.
The purpose of this proposition is not to advocate that creationism or
creation-science' 3 be introduced into the public school forum. Addition-
ally, the purpose of this proposition is not to limit the teaching of evolu-
tion as a means of endorsing creationism, creation-science, or the tenets
of any particular religious doctrine. The essential purpose of the public
school system is to educate society, and as such, it is recognized that the
theory of evolution may have great value in promoting scientific
awareness. The issue, therefore, is not evolution versus creationism.
The purpose of this proposition is essentially twofold. First, the pur-
pose is to protect the freedom of mind and conscience of impressionable
students from views which may conflict with their private religious be-
liefs and the religious beliefs of their families.' The second purpose,
which is related to the first, is to promote compassion and understanding
of a child's religious beliefs. As one commentator stated, "It is not that
parents want the public schools to proselytize in their favor; it is rather
that they do not want the schools to press their own children to reject
what the parents believe by calling into question a central article of their
faith."'
This proposed solution has actually been adopted by at least one mem-
ber of the judiciary. In Segraves v. California Board of Education,'
the Creation-Science Research Center sued the California Board of Edu-
cation, claiming that the state's public school science curriculum "assert-
563. See supra notes 304-11 and accompanying text; accord Schaeffer, supra note
463; see McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(arguing that it is unlikely that public schools could ever teach either creationism or
creation-science without violating the Establishment Clause because "[t]here is no way
teachers can teach the Genesis account of creation in a secular manner"), aff d, 723
F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1983). But see generally Leedes, supra note 308 (examining the
educational value of scientific creationism).
564. This first purpose is in accordance with the Court's rationale for prohibiting all
forms of religious expression in the public schools. As the Court has stated, "Families
entrust public schools with the education of their children, but condition their trust
on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance reli-
gious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her
family." Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584.
565. See Carter, supra note 559, at 981.
566. No. 278978 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 12, 1981); see supra note 1.
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ed evolutionary theories dogmatically and violated the free exercise of
religion." 7 Superior Court Judge Irving H. Perluss ordered the school
board to teach evolution as a theory and not as scientific fact.' Such a
proposition would not appear to have any adverse effects on the quality
of education in the public school "[sbo long as students recognize they
are free to draw their own ultimate conclusions. " '
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether govern-
ment may mandate that evolution be taught as theory rather than as
proven fact. This proposed solution, however, finds some support in the
Court's dictum. In Edwards v. Aguillard,7 ° the Supreme Court invali-
dated a Louisiana law which required that the theory of evolution be ac-
companied by equal instruction in the theory of creation-science."' The
Court ruled that the law impermissibly endorsed religion by advancing
the belief that a supernatural being created humankind.72 In striking
down the law, the Court noted, "We do not imply that a legislature could
never require that scientific critiques of prevailing theories be taught."'m
Regardless of the Court's dictum, it seems incomprehensible that requir-
ing public schools to teach the truth-that evolution is not a proven
scientific fact-would violate the United States Constitution.
IX. CONCLUSION
In applying the principles of the First Amendment, the United States
Supreme Court has been especially vigorous in striking down laws and
practices that in any way introduce the tenets of religion into the public
school system. However, it often appears that "there exists a constitu-
tional right on the part of non-believers to be protected from unpalatable
567. Schaeffer, supra note 463, at 836-37 (citing Segraves, No. 278978 (Cal. Super.
Ct. June 12, 1981)) (arguing that creation-science is inherently religious).
568. Id. at 837.
569. Freed, supra note 163, at "1183.
570. 482 U.S. 578 (1987); see Schaeffer, supra note 463, (providing additional analy-
sis of the Edwards decision).
571. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 580-81, 593.
572. Id. at 591-92.
573. Id. at 593. See generally Schaeffer, supra note 463 (discussing the legal back-
ground of the creation-science versus evolution debate). But see Freed, supra note
163, at 1182 n.264 (interpreting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), as holding
that evolution can be taught as fact).
impositions of religious beliefs, but no corresponding right on the part of
believers to be protected from ideas which they find offensive. " '
Due to the rapid expansion of beliefs which can be classified as reli-
gious in nature, the line between that which can be labeled sectarian and
that which can be labeled secular has become truly tenuous. On that ba-
sis, the Supreme Court must recognize that in our pluralistic society
those beliefs which can be characterized as religious in nature cannot be
dogmatically determined. As such, the Court should be equally vigorous
in addressing those laws and practices that introduce the tenets of both
theistic and non-theistic religions intothe public schools.
Contrary to modem portrayals, one does not have to be a "radical
fundamentalist" to believe in the precepts of one's religious faith. Similar-
ly, one does not have to be an avid supporter of creation-science to be-
lieve that the theory of evolution is far from an established "fact." Lastly,
one certainly does not have to be either a "radical fundamentalist" or an
avid supporter of creation-science to believe that the First Amendment
was designed to protect the integrity of all religious beliefs-whether
those beliefs can be classified as theistic or non-theistic.
In an era in which every nuance of life is viewed as alienating a partic-
ular group, it is perplexing to note that our society has been so willing to
turn its back on religious believers who see their very way of life
jeopardized by government action. If government wishes to remain truly
neutral as to all religions, it must respect those beliefs that refute the
theory of evolution. To accomplish this goal, government must mandate
that evolution be taught for what it is-a theory. Our society is designed
to accommodate cultural diversity, and as such, "it can not afford to
place 'a badge of inferiority' on some of its citizens" because of their reli-
gious beliefs.Y
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576. The author wishes to thank his niece, Jennifer O'Neill, whose Christmas Eve
story inspired this Comment.
552
